Artem E. Moskvin is the public registry contact for AS210724, a lean IPv6-only AS in Canada. The profile relies solely on RIPE and BGP data; no personal or commercial verification exists. The ASN’s three prefixes depend on a handful of peers, making it susceptible to registry hijacking or routing changes. Watchpoints centre on registry record mutations, prefix changes, and peering churn.

Artem E. Moskvin

Artem E. Moskvin is the sole public registry contact for AS210724, a recently registered IPv6-only autonomous system in Canada. He holds both administrative and technical roles under the RIPE handle AEM136-RIPE, concentrating routing control for the network’s three prefixes in a single account. No independent verification of his identity or the network’s commercial purpose exists beyond the RIPE NCC database.

Why It Matters

Any modification to the aut-num, organisation, or person records can immediately alter how the three prefixes are routed globally, potentially causing outages or enabling traffic interception. The network’s obscurity increases the risk that such changes pass unnoticed, delaying response and amplifying damage. Services relying on those addresses—whether internal, experimental, or future commercial—face a concentrated single-point-of-failure risk.

What Public Sources Show

Artem E. Moskvin is the sole public registry contact for the IPv6‑only autonomous system AS210724 in Canada. As both admin‑c and tech‑c under RIPE handle AEM136‑RIPE, he has exclusive authority over the network’s routing records. A single compromised account could redirect or blackhole traffic for the three originated prefixes, since no redundant contacts exist.

This concentration makes Moskvin—or anyone accessing his account—a potential single point of failure for any service depending on those addresses.

RIPE NCC records show AS210724 was created on 8 April 2025, with organisation ORG‑AM420‑RIPE and person handle AEM136‑RIPE. IPGeolocation and Cloudflare Radar report three announced IPv6 prefixes: 2a0f:85c1:c70::/48, 2a0f:85c1:c13::/48, and 2a0f:85c1:c7f::/48, with no IPv4 routes. Upstream is Free Range Cloud Hosting (AS53356); additional peers listed include AS212895, AS35708, AS24381, and AS41051. No PeeringDB entry or first‑party service documentation corroborates these relationships.

Beyond the registry fingerprints, public evidence about Moskvin or the network is thin. The domain amoskvin.ca is listed as the ASN’s website but hosts no corporate content, product pages, or service descriptions. No business registration, customer references, or financial records link the network to commercial activity. No independent biography, employer profile, or identity document corroborates the name Artem E. Moskvin as listed in the RIPE database.

Moskvin’s control surface is confined to the RIPE NCC database. As admin‑c and tech‑c, he can update the aut‑num object, IRR import/export policies, and maintainer credentials. These changes immediately alter how the three prefixes are accepted by peers and propagated in BGP. He also controls the organisation record and route objects, so a single erroneous or malicious update could reroute all traffic destined for those address blocks.

Because the network has no redundant contacts, troubleshooting after a misconfiguration would likely be delayed. Its upstream provider Free Range Cloud Hosting and other peers accept routes based on registry state and BGP announcements; inconsistency could blackhole the prefixes or attract traffic to an illegitimate destination. The low profile makes it improbable that other operators would detect such anomalies promptly.

Watchpoints centre on changes to the registry records, unexpected BGP announcements, and any expansion of the network’s public footprint. A modification to the person, organisation, or aut‑num objects would signal a possible transfer of control. The appearance of a new website, PeeringDB entry, or corporate registration would help clarify the entity behind AS210724. Sudden prefix withdrawals or new announcements that deviate from the established peer set warrant immediate investigation.

The profile remains anchored to the RIPE registry alone. No government‑issued identification, employer confirmation, or third‑party source validates the name or role. The network’s short operational history and absent user community leave fundamental questions about its purpose, resilience, and the operator’s intentions unanswered. Until public corroboration emerges, Moskvin should be treated as a registry‑contact anchor rather than a fully vetted infrastructure operator.

Operating Surface

Moskvin is the admin-c and tech-c for AS210724, with authority to modify the aut-num object, IRR import/export policies, and maintainer credentials. This allows him to directly control how the network’s three IPv6 prefixes—2a0f:85c1:c70::/48, 2a0f:85c1:c13::/48, and 2a0f:85c1:c7f::/48—are announced and accepted across the internet.

Changes to Moskvin’s registry records or the ASN’s routing could disrupt reachability of its IPv6 prefixes, potentially affecting upstream provider Free Range Cloud Hosting (AS53356) and other peers. Because no redundant contacts exist, a single account compromise could lead to a complete hijack of the ASN’s routing. Monitoring his registry handle and BGP announcements provides early warning of control shifts or misconfiguration.

Watchpoints

Moskvin's single-point control over a low-profile IPv6 network creates a surveillance target for registry hijackers or misconfiguration risks. The lack of redundant contacts heightens the importance of monitoring his RIPE handle and BGP feeds.

Watch for any changes to the AEM136-RIPE handle, the aut-num object, or the organisation record. Monitor BGP for new prefix announcements, withdrawals, or AS path anomalies. Track whether amoskvin.ca develops content or a PeeringDB entry appears.

No independent identity verification exists. The network's purpose, user base, and commercial intent are unknown. Live route counts and peer lists should be refreshed at publication. Missing corporate registration, business license, or financial records.

Sources

• Internet registry record - public-source identity and registry context for AMoskvin Artem Moskvin.
• RIPE registry record - Official RIPE Database query page for AS210724 is the public registry surface for the aut-num record, including AS name, organisation, admin and technical contact handles, status, maintainers, and timestamps.
• Registry RDAP / WHOIS record - RIPE RDAP autnum endpoint is the public RDAP form of AS210724 and links the ASN to public registry entities including the AEM136-RIPE person handle.
• radar.cloudflare.com - Cloudflare Radar identifies AS210724 as AMoskvin in Canada and lists https://amoskvin.ca as the website for the ASN.
• radar.cloudflare.com - Cloudflare Radar routing page provides a public routing-observability surface for AS210724, including announced address space, BGP announcements, connectivity, RPKI ASPA, IRR AS-SETs, and routing anomaly sections.
• ipgeolocation.io - IPGeolocation's ASN page lists AS210724 as Artem Moskvin, AS name AMoskvin, organisation Artem Moskvin, country CA, website amoskvin.ca, 0 IPv4 routes, 3 IPv6 routes, registry RIPE, date allocated 2025-04-08, and IPv6 routes 2a0f:85c1:c70::/48, 2a0f:85c1:c13::/48, and 2a0f:85c1:c7f::/48.
• Registry RDAP / WHOIS record - IPIP WHOIS mirror reproduces RIPE-derived aut-num, organisation, and person fields for AS210724, including AS name AMoskvin, org-name Artem Moskvin, admin-c and tech-c AEM136-RIPE, and the RIPE creation and last-modified timestamps.
• bgp.he.net - Hurricane Electric's Canada ASN listing includes AS210724 as Artem Moskvin with 0 IPv4 routes and 3 IPv6 routes, providing independent routing-list corroboration.