The most consequential price in the recent history of Odolanów, a town of five thousand in southern Wielkopolska, was not set by any of its shops or by the gas-processing plant on its edge. It was set in June 2017, when the regional operator INEA — since renamed Fiberhost — signed a grant contract worth 105,363,217.91 złoty to design, build and connect 26,444 households and 130 public institutions across the Kalisz subregion, the ring of counties around Kalisz and Ostrów Wielkopolski. Just over half of that sum, 53,479,837.38 złoty, came from the European Regional Development Fund through Poland's Digital Poland programme, known by its Polish initials POPC. Divide money by homes and the project works out at a little under 4,000 złoty per address covered, of which roughly 2,022 złoty was granted outright.
Those 26,444 addresses are not an abstraction. They surround Odolanów. They sit in the same villages, along the same roads and on the same low-voltage power poles where a local general partnership called ZAPNET had been stringing its own network since 2004 — first unlicensed radio, later fibre — one paying customer at a time. A subsidy calibrated to make unprofitable territory profitable for its recipient does something precise and uncompensated to everyone else standing in the territory: it reprices their assets downward on the day the contract is signed. The glass has not yet been blown through the duct, and already every home the incumbent local operator hoped to win must now be won against a competitor whose capital cost has been cut in half by the state.
And the ring keeps being redrawn. POPC ran three national competitions and closed; its successor under Poland's EU-financed recovery plan, the KPO broadband investment known as C1.1.1, has run four more. The fourth alone carried an allocation of 2,458,290,300 złoty and drew 209 applications covering some 315,287 addresses; by November 2025 the implementing authority had signed 154 contracts worth about 776 million złoty in that round, on top of 163 contracts worth roughly 2.4 billion złoty across the first three. This is the distortion inside which a village operator in Wielkopolska must now do all of its arithmetic. What follows is that arithmetic, worked through one company's public record — because ZAPNET's record turns out to be unusually complete, and because the company's answer to the distortion was not the one the textbook predicts.
Two addresses, two Zaparts, one registry trail
Start with who the operator actually is, because the paperwork identity and the shop-front identity sit in different villages. The shop front is at ulica Leśna 1 in Odolanów, the address on the company's website, its invoices and its customer portal. The legal person behind it is ZAPNET KAROL ZAPART SPÓŁKA JAWNA, a general partnership entered in Poland's National Court Register under KRS number 0000314099 on 22 September 2008, with tax number 6222690706, statistical number 300947380, and a registered seat at Korczaka 31 in Sośnie — a forest-edge village in the south of the Ostrów county, one of the four localities where the firm later built its first grant-funded radio network. The register names two partners, Karol Juliusz Zapart and Sławomir Jan Zapart, both since the 2008 registration. A spółka jawna is the most exposed corporate form Polish law offers a trading business: the partners answer for its debts with their personal property, and, so long as revenue stays under the audit thresholds and the partners are natural persons, it files no annual accounts. None have surfaced through the registry mirrors consulted for this piece, and that absence is itself a datum: every revenue figure for this company must be inferred, and is flagged as inference below.
The trading history predates the partnership. The company describes itself as operating since 2004; the zapnet.pl domain was created on 3 January 2005 according to the .pl registry's whois service at dns.pl, and the Wayback Machine holds a capture of the site from July 2007. On the numbering side the identity is equally continuous: the RIPE database records organisation ORG-SZTA2-RIPE, "Slawomir Zapart trading as ZAPNET KAROL ZAPART Sp.j.", a paying member of the European registry with its address at Leśna 1, and autonomous system 197833 under the name ZAPNET-AS. The routing view adds texture the company's marketing does not: AS197833 announces twelve blocks of IPv4 addresses — about 3,300 addresses in total — and every one of its visible BGP adjacencies is a route server of the EPIX exchange in Katowice and Warsaw, which matches the company's own claim of EPIX participation and says something about its cost base that a later section will use.
One registry resisted. Polish telecoms operators must appear in the regulator UKE's register of telecommunications undertakings, and ZAPNET plainly does — but the register's public search front-end is script-driven, and the query endpoints tried for this piece returned bare errors, so the entry number itself could not be read directly. The company's standing with the regulator is nonetheless documented beyond doubt in UKE's own files, which name it repeatedly: a 2021 decision adjusting its pole-access contracts with the power distributor Energa-Operator, a 2020 application to modify one of its licensed radio-frequency reservations, and a November 2025 consultation of its wholesale offer for a state-funded network. An operator that exists in the regulator's decisions exists in its register; the number is a formality this article could not retrieve, and says so rather than inventing it.
So the identity reconciles cleanly: one partnership, two Zaparts, a seat in Sośnie, an office in Odolanów, a domain from 2005, a European registry membership, and a routing presence — all matching the directory's slug and its modest evidence boundary of a live website and a pair of domain references. What the directory's thin record does not show is the thing that makes this company analytically interesting: its grant history.
Four grants in fifteen years, and a ladder of rising intensity
ZAPNET has taken public co-financing for network construction four times, and the sequence reads like a history of Polish broadband policy in miniature — with the state's share of the bill climbing at each rung.
The first rung was radio. In April 2011 the firm signed a contract under measure 8.4 of the Innovative Economy programme to build a last-mile wireless network in Sośnie, Przygodzice, Raszków and Biadki: 684,969 złoty of project cost, 323,070 złoty of it European money, for a network obliged to reach at least 200 households using 5 GHz Wi-Fi and licensed point-to-point links. A second, similar contract followed in October 2012 — 886,608.15 złoty, with 422,291.77 złoty co-financed, eight localities, at least 195 households. Call the state's share at this rung 47 percent, and the per-household budget roughly 3,400 to 4,500 złoty, radio being cheap to deploy and expensive to keep honest.
The second rung was fibre under POPC's first competition. Between October 2016 and September 2018 ZAPNET built an FTTH network in the Krotoszyn county under project POPC.01.01.00-30-0247/16, a contract of 4,727,366.15 złoty with 1,570,203.44 złoty of EU contribution — settled, per the government's grant map, at 4,711,927.85 złoty spent and 1,563,876.03 złoty granted: 1,346 households and two schools on fibre at 100/30 megabits, plus 142 households on radio. The grant map's project description is worth quoting for its candour: the area is dispersed, mixed urban-rural, and "in market conditions, investment without subsidies would be unprofitable" — the official definition of a white spot. Note the intensity: the state carried only 33 percent of this rung, and the per-address cost, at about 3,167 złoty across the 1,488 points, still had to be two-thirds financed by two partners with unlimited personal liability.
The third rung is the striking one. Under the KPO's C1.1.1 investment ZAPNET won competition area 6.02.17.1 in the Oleśnica county of Lower Silesia — sixteen villages of the Syców municipality, the next county over from its Milicz footprint — with a project of 5,925,770.60 złoty carrying 5,013,201.92 złoty of European co-financing: 1,352 contracted address points, expanded in execution to 1,535 households, each to be offered at least 300 megabits, gigabit-capable, with the build phased to completion by 31 August 2026. The state's share of this rung is 84.6 percent. In one programme cycle, the public contribution to a village network in ZAPNET's part of Poland went from a third of the bill to nearly seven-eighths of it.
There is a claimed fourth rung. The company's own history page lists a fourth-round KPO project it calls "Światłowód Milicz-Krotoszyn" alongside the Syców build. The implementing authority announced its fourth-round contracts in batches from November 2025, but ZAPNET does not appear in the readable body of those announcements, and the ranking-list attachments would not load in the sessions run for this piece; the Milicz–Krotoszyn project is therefore recorded here as a company claim with no published value — a gap the closing section returns to, because a signed contract of that shape would extend the entire analysis one county south.
Sum the documented rungs and the pattern is unambiguous: roughly 7.32 million złoty of public co-financing across fifteen years, against perhaps 4.9 million of the partnership's own money, has built ZAPNET's subsidised estate — some 3,400 grant-funded address points, sitting alongside whatever the firm built commercially in Odolanów, Milicz, Krotoszyn and the villages between. The textbook says a small operator facing subsidised overbuild either sells or shrinks. ZAPNET's record says there is a third option: become the subsidy's own retail arm in the territories too small for the big beneficiaries to bother with. The rest of this piece prices that option.
What 49.99 złoty buys in Odolanów
The company's published tariff table is the cleanest primary document in its file, and it repays close reading. For multi-family buildings, the current price list runs: 200/50 megabits at 49.99 złoty a month, 400/100 at 59.99, 600/200 at 69.99, and 1000/300 at 89.99, all on 24-month contracts, with a one-off installation fee that falls as the speed rises — 100 złoty at the bottom of the ladder, 40 at the top, a small standing bribe to upsell. For single-family houses the menu starts only at 400 megabits, the installation fee jumps to 247 złoty (falling to 147 on the gigabit tier), and every contract carries an additional 15 złoty monthly charge the sheet calls subscriber-line maintenance. All prices already assume two behavioural discounts of 5 złoty each, for e-invoicing and marketing consent.
Read as economics rather than marketing, the sheet is a confession. The single-family surcharges — a two-and-a-half-times installation fee plus 180 złoty a year of line maintenance — price the true gradient of rural FTTH: longer drops, more civil works per customer, more storm damage per kilometre. The absent 200-megabit tier for houses pushes the hardest-to-serve customers onto higher-revenue plans. The behavioural discounts monetise billing costs and a marketing database. And the top of the card, 89.99 złoty for a gigabit, is where the competitive squeeze becomes visible, because that number exists in public comparison tables. When the local news portal Ostrów24 compared fibre offers available in the county in March 2023, ZAPNET's gigabit at 89.99 złoty (with 100 megabits upstream) sat against Orange's 1000/300 at 79.99 and Netia's at 70 — the local operator listing 12.5 percent above the national incumbent and 28 percent above its cheapest national rival, while offering a third of their upload.
Around the broadband core the firm sells the classic small-operator bundle: interactive television with catch-up and network recording, telephony, Wi-Fi installations, monitoring, an antivirus reselling line, and business connections up to 10 gigabits with fixed public addressing — the 3,300 RIPE-registered addresses being the raw material of that enterprise tier. Who pays, then: households across more than a hundred localities in five counties of southern Wielkopolska and northern Lower Silesia, a business tail in Odolanów, Milicz and Krotoszyn, two schools connected under the POPC contract, and — since the Syców build — up to 1,535 subsidised households the state has paid it to pass. The schools deserve a sentence of their own, because they are the one place where the state appears on the revenue side rather than the capital side: school connections built under POPC feed the national education network OSE, through which the state institute NASK delivers every Polish school a free 100-megabit service over infrastructure it procures from the operators who built it — a small, indexed, publicly funded recurring stream that behaves like nothing else on a village ISP's ledger. The company claims roughly ten thousand customers in total. That number appears nowhere but on its own site, and the revenue passage below treats it accordingly.
The promo price that travels up the subsidised glass
Here is the price pair on which this article's thesis turns, both legs published, both current to the spring of 2026, both for the same national market. In April 2026 Orange Polska put its fibre entry tier on promotion at 39.99 złoty a month for 300 megabits — a 24-month price guarantee, 60 złoty activation, router rental at 4.99, against a standard price the same report gives as 65.01 złoty. ZAPNET's entry tier, from its own price list of the same season, is 49.99 złoty for 200 megabits. Both are list prices, promotional on Orange's side; no transaction price exists in this consumer market beyond the list, so the pair is stated for what it is. On it, the national incumbent's street price undercuts the village operator by 20 percent while delivering half again the speed.
The pair understates the asymmetry, because the incumbent does not sell broadband so much as it sells gravity. The same April promotion bundled the 300-megabit line with a 500-gigabyte mobile plan at 69.99 złoty — fixed and mobile on one bill, a product no standalone village network can construct at any price, since the mobile leg requires a national radio estate. Convergence is the quiet second front of the squeeze: every household in ZAPNET's footprint already pays someone for mobile service, and each of the three national mobile groups can fold fibre into that existing relationship at a discount the local operator must answer from broadband margin alone.
The mechanism that carries that price into ZAPNET's villages is the interesting part, because Orange's own fibre footprint in the Odolanów countryside is thin. The carrier does not need one. Under POPC's open-access rules, Orange signed successive wholesale contracts to retail over Fiberhost's subsidised network — the third-competition deal alone put 550,000 additional households within Orange's fibre reach, toward a Fiberhost open network that passed 1.3 million households across eight voivodeships by the end of 2022. The state paid half the capital cost of the Kalisz-subregion glass; Fiberhost operates it; Orange, Play and the rest retail over it at national price points. The effect, seen from Leśna 1, is that Brussels' recovery money and Warsaw's cohesion money do not merely fund a competing network — they import the promotional price card of a carrier with 4.6 million fibre-reach households into villages whose entire addressable market is a few hundred rooftops. A local operator can match the price and starve, or hold its price and shrink, and the UKE's national statistics say which way the market leans: the regulator's 2024 report counts 9.8 million fixed-internet users generating 6.3 billion złoty, an average revenue per user of 53.8 złoty a month — about twelve and a half euro, among the lowest broadband price levels in the union — while the same regulator's consumer survey puts the average declared fixed-internet bill at 67.4 złoty. ZAPNET's whole price card sits inside that band. There is no pricing room above it; the room below it belongs to whoever amortised their network with a grant.
The arithmetic of a village network
Now assemble the unit economics explicitly, keeping evidence and inference separate.
The evidence. Building fibre past a rural home in ZAPNET's territory costs the company itself between roughly 3,167 złoty — its POPC settlement of 4,711,927.85 złoty over 1,488 address points — and 3,860 złoty, its KPO contract of 5,925,770.60 złoty over 1,535 households. Those are filed contract values divided by filed address counts, not estimates, and they bracket Fiberhost's 3,984 złoty per address on the neighbouring subsidised build. On the revenue side, the company's own tariff sheet nets to between 40.64 and 73.16 złoty a month per subscriber after removing Poland's 23 percent VAT from the published 49.99–89.99 range. On the cost side, the regulator has fixed the price of the physical layer ZAPNET hangs much of its network on: the UKE's February 2021 framework decisions set access to low-voltage power poles at 1.73 złoty per pole per month and 2.75 złoty for medium voltage, and a company-specific decision of November 2021 aligned ZAPNET's existing Energa-Operator contracts to those terms. At typical rural spacing of 25 to 30 poles per kilometre — an engineering rule of thumb, flagged as such — a kilometre of aerial fibre rents its supports for around 43 to 52 złoty a month, which is why aerial build on the power grid, not trenched duct, is the only capital structure at which villages of this density can be wired at 3,200–3,900 złoty a home at all. Upstream, the routing table shows the company's entire visible interconnection running through the EPIX exchange's route servers — the cooperative fabric through which Poland's small operators pool peering and buy transit at rates a lone 10,000-subscriber network could never negotiate bilaterally.
The inference, stated as such. Take the build cost of 3,860 złoty per home passed from the KPO filing. Assume — this is an assumption, not a record — that 40 percent of passed homes eventually subscribe, a level rural Polish networks treat as success; per actual subscriber the capital cost becomes 9,650 złoty. Assume further that of a blended net revenue of about 45 złoty a month, some 60 percent survives content, transit, pole rents, maintenance and support as contribution — roughly 27 złoty a month, 324 a year. Unsubsidised, the capital payback on one village subscriber is then on the order of thirty years, against customer contracts that run twenty-four months and network electronics that live seven to ten. At 30 percent take-up it is worse than forty. This is the entire business case in one line: without a grant, rural FTTH in Poland is a thirty-year bond funding a two-year customer, and no partnership whose owners are personally liable can rationally hold that bond. Now apply the KPO's 84.6 percent co-financing. ZAPNET's own cash in the Syców build is 912,568.68 złoty — about 594 złoty per household passed, 1,486 per subscriber at the same 40 percent take-up — and the identical contribution stream pays it back in under five years. The subsidy does not tilt the business case; it is the business case. Everything else — the tariff design, the wholesale offer, the expansion map — is downstream of that single ratio.
Two smaller numbers in the tariff sheet close the loop on this arithmetic. The 247-złoty installation fee on a single-family 400-megabit contract recovers perhaps a fifth of what a rural drop actually costs to build — the rest is capitalised into the 24-month term and the 15-złoty monthly maintenance line, which over a contract cycle quietly collects another 360 złoty from exactly the customers whose connections cost most. And the falling installation ladder on the multi-family side — 100 złoty at 200 megabits, 40 at a gigabit — prices the opposite fact: in a block already wired, the marginal cost of a faster tier is a configuration change, so the fee is pure steering. A tariff sheet, read closely, is a cost model the operator publishes without meaning to.
Revenue, finally, since no accounts exist to consult. Two triangulations, reconciled: first, the company's claimed ten thousand customers priced against its own tariff card nets 4.9 to 5.9 million złoty a year on broadband alone, before television, telephony and the business tier; second, the same ten thousand lines at the UKE's economy-wide fixed-broadband revenue per user of 53.8 złoty implies about 6.5 million. The two legs agree on a band of roughly 5 to 7 million złoty of net annual revenue — but both stand on the company's own subscriber figure, which is single-sourced from its marketing page and uncorroborated by any filing; the band inherits that fragility in full. A weak third check points the same way: a firm that could finance a 3.1-million-złoty own-share on the POPC build across 2016–2018, and finds 0.9 million for the KPO build now, is behaving like a business in exactly that revenue class. Treat the band as a working estimate, not a fact.
Open access at 42 złoty, retail at 40
Every network built with POPC or KPO money carries an open-access duty: the beneficiary must offer the subsidised infrastructure wholesale to any rival retailer, at prices the regulator polices. ZAPNET's Syców network duly has a wholesale offer that UKE put to public consultation on 18 November 2025, listing bitstream, unbundled loops, dark fibre, colocation and pole access. On paper, the state has bought itself a neutral village network. The arithmetic says otherwise. In April 2025 UKE published the permissible ceilings for wholesale prices on subsidised networks, benchmarked against more competitive EU regions: for the most-sold 300-megabit bitstream tier, 42.39 złoty a month in multi-family buildings and 56.27 in single-family ones, without the terminal unit. Set those ceilings beside Orange's 39.99 złoty retail promotion for the same speed. A national retailer wanting to poach a customer in Syców over ZAPNET's subsidised glass would pay more at the regulated wholesale ceiling than it charges the customer at street price in Wrocław. The open-access duty is real, the offer is filed, the consultation ran its fourteen days — and the economics guarantee that, at village scale, almost nobody will ever use it. The beneficiary keeps the retail layer by default.
The same blade cuts the other way, and this is the part of the distortion that actually binds ZAPNET. In principle the firm could grow costlessly by retailing over Fiberhost's subsidised Kalisz-subregion network, the way Orange does. But the wholesale rates that make village open access notional for entrants make it notional for ZAPNET too — and the one operator with the scale to argue rates down tried and failed: Orange formally complained that Fiberhost's wholesale pricing was excessive, and UKE was not persuaded. Open access in subsidised rural Poland thus functions mostly as a corridor between giants: Orange rents Fiberhost's million-home footprint because at that volume thin margins still sum to money, while a ten-thousand-customer operator can neither profitably rent its glass out nor profitably rent anyone else's in. Each subsidised network becomes, in practice, a little vertically integrated monopoly at the address level — which is precisely why winning one's own competition area, rather than riding someone else's, was the only rational move on ZAPNET's board.
Other people's poles, other people's routes
The dependency map that emerges from the regulator's files is unusually explicit for a company this size, and each edge of it carries a price already cited or a risk worth naming. The physical layer hangs on the power distributors: the Energa decision governs the pole contracts, and the 1.73-złoty rate that makes aerial fibre viable is a regulated price that a future tariff review could move — the distributors fought for several times that figure before 2021, and pole-access fees are the single input whose doubling would do the most damage to village-network operating margins. The radio layer, the company's original business, is visibly sunsetting: a 2020 filing in UKE's reservation-amendment lists shows ZapNet asking to narrow one licensed link channel from 7 MHz to 3.5 — an operator handing spectrum back as fibre replaces towers. The routing layer runs entirely through one exchange fabric: EPIX adjacencies are cheap and redundant across two cities, but they are a single commercial relationship in a way that a carrier with bilateral transit contracts would not tolerate; the observable mitigation is that the association behind EPIX is member-governed, its fee structure cooperative rather than extractive. And above all of it sits the state as counterparty: the KPO build must be completed, inventoried and settled by 31 August 2026 under the phased milestones in the grant contract, and recovery-plan money arrives against verification, with clawback for shortfalls. For a partnership with unlimited personal liability, a failed settlement on a 5.9-million-złoty project is not a corporate event; it is a household one. That asymmetry — the state carries 85 percent of the capital but the Zapart family carries 100 percent of the execution risk — is the true price of the third rung of the ladder.
There is a currency dimension to that risk, and it runs through every grant contract in this file. The KPO's resources are denominated in euro and arrive in Brussels' rhythm; the obligations they finance — trenching crews, splicers, pole rents, electronics — are owed in złoty, at whatever the market charges in the season the milestone falls due. The contracts are fixed-sum: ZAPNET bid its Syców area against address counts and prices set when the competition was drawn, and executes it through 2025 and 2026, absorbing in between whatever Polish construction wages and cable prices have done — with no mechanism to reprice, only the one visible in the record, which is scope adjustment. The quiet expansion of the Syców project from 1,352 contracted points to 1,535 households actually covered reads, in this light, less like generosity than like the standard settling motion of a fixed-price grant meeting variable-cost reality: the beneficiary densifies where the build turned out cheaper, because the alternative — returning money — is the one outcome the deadline forbids. Small operators live inside that squeeze without the hedging desks the incumbents keep; for a two-partner firm, the euro–złoty basis of the entire recovery plan lands, ultimately, on two households in the Ostrów county.
Customer-side dependency is diffuse in the healthy sense: no anchor tenant appears anywhere in the record, the two POPC schools notwithstanding, and the switching friction built into the tariff sheet — 24-month terms, installation fees, a customer portal, television bundling — is the ordinary small-ISP moat. The substitutes that matter are not other fibre but Orange's, Play's and T-Mobile's fixed-wireless offers over 5G, which need no glass at all and price nationally; every year the mobile networks densify in southern Wielkopolska, the moat narrows from above.
What the reviews and one job advert suggest
The unofficial record is thin but not empty, and it points in a consistent direction. Customer reviews on the ISP directory that tracks the company split along a technological seam: subscribers on the fibre plant praise stability and local service — "the most professional provider in Odolanów" is the flavour — while the sharpest complaints, about advertised speeds not materialising and unannounced outages, cluster where the description suggests legacy radio territory. A review-aggregator entry and an active Facebook page used for outage notices round out the picture of a firm whose reputation risk lives almost entirely in its pre-fibre estate. The signal, if it is one, is that the company is running two networks with one support desk, and the older network is spending the brand equity the newer one earns. What would settle it: the take-up numbers on the Syców build once the KPO settlement publishes, and UKE's consumer-complaint statistics, neither yet public.
The hiring record whispers the same. A single engineering vacancy — an engineer for LAN, WLAN and FTTH network maintenance in Odolanów — is the only job trace found, and its title is the org chart in miniature: one person expected to span the wireless legacy, the fibre plant and customers' premises. No sales roles, no construction crews advertised; grant-funded builds in this segment are typically subcontracted to regional civil-works firms, with the operator keeping only design and acceptance in-house. A ten-thousand-customer operator that hires one maintenance engineer at a time is not preparing a leap in scale; it is defending a franchise. Against that reads one countersignal: a firm genuinely at the edge of its capacity does not bid for a fourth-round KPO area two counties from home. Either the Milicz–Krotoszyn claim is smaller than its name suggests, or the partnership is more leveraged — operationally, and perhaps financially — than its visible headcount implies. The published contract, when the implementing authority releases the fourth-round lists in full, will say which.
The facts that would move this judgement
The judgement as it stands: ZAPNET is a genuine, verifiable, twenty-year operator whose economics have been annexed by the subsidy system it learned to ride — a company whose marginal investment case is no longer set by its subscribers but by grant intensity, regulated pole rents and wholesale ceilings, and whose principal risks are now execution deadlines and policy reversals rather than competition in any classical sense. Several discoverable facts would move that judgement, some sharply.
The nearest is the fourth-round KPO contract. If the implementing authority's published lists confirm a Milicz–Krotoszyn award to ZAPNET with a value and address count in the Syców class, the company is compounding into a multi-county subsidised platform and the revenue band above is too low within two years; if no such contract appears, the o-nas page's claim was a bid that failed, and the growth story ends at 1,535 households. The KPO settlement itself is binary: documented completion by the August 2026 deadline validates the five-year-payback arithmetic, while a shortfall converts an 85-percent grant into a personally guaranteed liability. Third, the wholesale offer: if UKE's consultation produces material amendments, or — against the arithmetic — an actual tenant appears on the Syców network, the open-access analysis here would need genuine revision, and rural Polish broadband would have produced its first interesting counterexample. Fourth, any published subscriber or revenue figure — a UKE infrastructure return, a KIKE disclosure, an eventual filing if the partnership converts to a limited company (a conversion the liability asymmetry makes increasingly rational) — would replace the most fragile inference in this piece with a fact. Fifth, the input prices: a pole-rent revision above the 1.73-złoty rate, a FERC successor round redrawing the white-spot map around Odolanów yet again, or Orange extending its 39.99-złoty promotion into wholesale territory it currently ignores, would each reprice the franchise from a different side. And behind all of them sits the exit question this market has not yet answered: when the KPO lock-in windows expire in the early 2030s, the natural buyers of a few thousand subsidised rural connections are the very consolidators the subsidy created — and whether the Zaparts' third option ends in independence or in a sale to the network next door is the last fact this file cannot yet contain.
Evidence register
The company's own site and history page carry the trading identity, customer claim, coverage claim and project list. The KRS mirror establishes the partnership, partners, dates and registered seat. Grant economics rest on the company's POPC page, the state grant map's settled POPC entry, the KPO project page, and the two Innovative Economy pages (039, 084/11). The overbuild context comes from Fiberhost's EU-projects disclosures, the implementing authority's fourth-round page and contract-signing announcement, and TELKO.in's application count. Pricing rests on ZAPNET's tariff table, Telepolis's report of Orange's April 2026 promotion, and the Ostrów24 local comparison. Regulatory economics rest on UKE's files: the ZAPNET–Energa pole decision, KIKE's note on the 2021 pole-rate framework, the KPO wholesale-offer consultation, TELKO.in on the wholesale price ceilings, and the 2024 market report with its consumer-bill survey. The Orange–Fiberhost wholesale relationship is documented by Telepolis and TELKO.in. Network identity rests on the RIPE database and RIPEstat's prefix and adjacency views, plus the 2007 Wayback capture. Market signals come from the ISP directory's reviews, a review aggregator, the Facebook page, and a pracuj.pl vacancy. UKE's reservation-amendment listing documents the shrinking radio estate.