Summary

  • CRA’s 7 October update puts the ex-post Competition Policy and the ex-ante MDDD review at different stages: one has a final outcome; the other still points to consultation on dominance and remedies.
  • A finalized list of candidate and relevant markets is a framework for further assessment. It is not a finding that any named provider is dominant or that a remedy has been imposed.

The most consequential detail in CRA’s 7 October workshop update is a difference in status, not a newly named winner or loser. The regulator’s account describes the updated Competition Policy as the final outcome of the ex-post work. It calls the current Market Definition and Dominance Designation (MDDD) review an interim update: CRA has presented an updated market-definition method and a final list of Candidate and Relevant Markets, but consultation on dominance designations and proposed remedies remains in the next steps.

The distinction matters because “competition framework” covers two different jobs. The ex-post policy addresses conduct after it occurs. The ex-ante MDDD process asks which telecommunications markets may warrant prospective obligations, then examines whether a provider holds a dominant position in a relevant market. CRA’s November 2025 consultation announcement described the components as separate but linked. Its public framework page says the authority regularly assesses market power and considers obligations where necessary.

A market list is a starting point for judgment

CRA’s October 2025 consultation paper set out the sequence. Phase I updated the method and tested Candidate Markets against a Three Criteria Test to identify Relevant Markets. Phase II was to assess dominance in those relevant markets and consider remedies for providers found dominant. The paper said the previous MDDD review took place in 2016, so the new cycle is also a refresh of a market map built on a much older review.

That order separates scope from conclusion. A service can appear in a Relevant Market without the process having established which provider, if any, is dominant there. A dominance designation then needs its own evidence and decision. A remedy requires another link: a reasoned account of what constraint is missing and why the proposed obligation addresses it.

CRA’s 7 October account says the candidate/relevant-market list is finalized for the current review. It does not name the individual markets in the workshop recap, identify a provider, or describe a specific remedy. CRA’s framework page now lists a 1 September 2026 “ICT Competition Framework” entry with five attachments; the underlying documents, rather than the event summary, are where readers should check the adopted method and market list.

Two clocks, one sector

The updated Competition Policy and the MDDD review should therefore be read on separate calendars. A final policy document can establish the ex-post rules and procedures at the dates stated in that instrument. The MDDD track still has to connect a market definition to evidence of market power, then connect any designation to a proposed remedy and consultation. The 7 October report does not say that those later decisions have been made.

The sequence also changes what an operator can infer. A policy update may affect how conduct is assessed across the sector. A future ex-ante obligation would depend on market-specific findings and the terms of a later decision. Treating the whole framework as “finished” would overstate the MDDD position; treating every market on the list as already regulated would go further still.

There is a timing question for planners. The 2025 consultation paper had planned Phase II for the first half of 2026. At the October 2026 workshop, CRA still described consultation on dominance designations and remedies as a next step, without giving a revised date in the public recap. That comparison is a reason to use the latest notice for planning, not to treat an old timetable as a current commitment.

The practical test is whether each stage leaves a decision trail that businesses can inspect: the market boundary, the evidence used to define it, the dominance analysis, the proposed remedy, and when each rule takes effect. Without that chain, “final list” can sound more conclusive than it is. With it, operators can distinguish conduct rules that have reached an outcome from prospective controls still subject to market-by-market scrutiny.

Sources