HIRAGI LTD is a newly incorporated UK company (May 2026) that operates AS199550 with an exchange presence at EPIX.Katowice and a downstream relationship through Pipe Networks. The company's public footprint is sparse: no website, abuse contact, or announced prefixes are confirmed. Stale registry records still reflect a previous holder (ComNet Multimedia), creating uncertainty about the timing and mechanics of the holder transition. The watchpoint is that any change in routing, registry, or corporate disclosure could shift dependency maps and incident attribution before conventional transparency catches up. Evidence boundary: no direct RIPE DB objects, no financials, no corporate website. Task: monitor for prefix announcements, PeeringDB entry, or RIPE DB updates.
HIRAGI LTD is best treated as a UK network operator or hosting/data-processing company visible in public routing and measurement systems, not as an internet registry itself. The visible operating context is a routed network identity associated with AS199550, current measurement listings under HIRAGI LTD, and public interconnection evidence through Pipe Networks and EPIX.Katowice.
The company is tracked because its sparse public footprint—no website, no abuse contact, no announced prefixes in this evidence bundle—combined with stale registry records pointing to a previous holder, creates a watchpoint for analysts monitoring new entrants, registry transitions, and shifts in routing visibility that could affect incident attribution and dependency maps.
The company is tracked because its sparse public footprint—no website, no abuse contact, no announced prefixes in this evidence bundle—combined with stale registry records pointing to a previous holder, creates a watchpoint for analysts monitoring new entrants, registry transitions, and shifts in routing visibility that could affect incident attribution and dependency maps.
HIRAGI LTD is best treated as a UK network operator or hosting/data-processing company visible in public routing and measurement systems, not as an internet registry itself. The visible operating context is a routed network identity associated with AS199550, current measurement listings under HIRAGI LTD, and public interconnection evidence through Pipe Networks and EPIX.Katowice.
If HIRAGI LTD modifies its RIPE database objects, RPKI ROAs, BGP announcements, or exchange port configurations, the resulting changes will immediately alter how downstream networks and measurement platforms observe its traffic, potentially disrupting incident escalation paths and dependency assumptions before any corporate disclosure.
HIRAGI LTD is a newly incorporated UK company (May 2026) that operates AS199550 with an exchange presence at EPIX.Katowice and a downstream relationship through Pipe Networks. The company's public footprint is sparse: no website, abuse contact, or announced prefixes are confirmed. Stale registry records still reflect a previous holder (ComNet Multimedia), creating uncertainty about the timing and mechanics of the holder transition. The watchpoint is that any change in routing, registry, or corporate disclosure could shift dependency maps and incident attribution before conventional transparency catches up. Evidence boundary: no direct RIPE DB objects, no financials, no corporate website. Task: monitor for prefix announcements, PeeringDB entry, or RIPE DB updates.
If HIRAGI LTD modifies its RIPE database objects, RPKI ROAs, BGP announcements, or exchange port configurations, the resulting changes will immediately alter how downstream networks and measurement platforms observe its traffic, potentially disrupting incident escalation paths and dependency assumptions before any corporate disclosure.
| 0.90–1.00 | A | High — direct sources |
| 0.75–0.89 | A/B | Strong |
| 0.55–0.74 | B/C | Medium |
| 0.35–0.54 | C/D | Weak–medium |
| 0.10–0.34 | D | Weak signal |
| 0.00–0.09 | D | Internal monitoring |
Several public sources
HIRAGI LTD
HIRAGI LTD is a newly registered UK private limited company operating autonomous system AS199550, with a sparse but visible internet infrastructure footprint observable through routing measurement platforms and an exchange presence at EPIX.Katowice. The company's impact stems from its potential to change attribution and reachability without prior corporate transparency, given the absence of a public website or abuse contact and stale registry records hinting at a prior holder.
Why It Matters
If HIRAGI LTD modifies its RIPE database objects, RPKI ROAs, BGP announcements, or exchange port configurations, the resulting changes will immediately alter how downstream networks and measurement platforms observe its traffic, potentially disrupting incident escalation paths and dependency assumptions before any corporate disclosure.
What Public Sources Show
HIRAGI LTD is a recently incorporated UK company whose routed network identity, AS199550, is visible across global measurement platforms. Its significance lies in attribution and reachability: any change in its routing or registry records propagates immediately through the internet's dependency maps, while the company offers no website, abuse contact, or public corporate narrative to explain the shift.
Public records list HIRAGI LTD as company number 17195327, registered on 1 May 2026 under SIC 63110 for data processing and hosting. Cloudflare Radar and APNIC Labs associate AS199550 with the company. BGP.tools shows a downstream peer relationship with Pipe Networks and an IPv4/IPv6 presence at the EPIX.Katowice exchange.
The company's operating surface is strikingly sparse. It lacks a PeeringDB entry, a company website, and an abuse mailbox. The only publicly observable control points are the RIPE database objects managing AS199550, the announced routing policies, and the physical 40 Gbps exchange port. Everything else is inference.
This thinness magnifies the impact of any routing or registry change. If HIRAGI LTD creates an RPKI ROA, adds a prefix, or updates its aut‑num, the effect ripples through the BGP mesh instantly. Network incident responders and measurement dashboards will register a new configuration without any accompanying corporate announcement.
Conversely, if the company withdraws its exchange presence or changes upstream providers, downstream visibility collapses. The dependency chain from Pipe Networks into AS199550 makes the company a link that, if broken or re‑numbered, could frustrate abuse reporting and traffic engineering for peers.
Several watchpoints demand monitoring. The first concrete signal would be an official website or PeeringDB listing; either would confirm a deliberate infrastructure operator. A fresh prefix announcement would raise the company's routing relevance, while a RIPE organisation update would resolve the stale records currently pointing to the previous holder, ComNet Multimedia.
Uncertainty surrounds the holder transition. Older IPinfo and WHOIS mirrors still show ComNet Multimedia as the responsible entity, but the record transfer date is not publicly timestamped. Without direct access to the current RIPE DB aut‑num object, the exact date when HIRAGI LTD assumed control remains an evidence gap.
Until the company discloses its services, customer base, or operational staff, it remains a low‑visibility node with an outsized potential to surprise.
Operating Surface
HIRAGI LTD is best treated as a UK network operator or hosting/data-processing company visible in public routing and measurement systems, not as an internet registry itself. The visible operating context is a routed network identity associated with AS199550, current measurement listings under HIRAGI LTD, and public interconnection evidence through Pipe Networks and EPIX.Katowice.
The company is tracked because its sparse public footprint—no website, no abuse contact, no announced prefixes in this evidence bundle—combined with stale registry records pointing to a previous holder, creates a watchpoint for analysts monitoring new entrants, registry transitions, and shifts in routing visibility that could affect incident attribution and dependency maps.
Watchpoints
HIRAGI LTD represents a class of minimal-footprint network operators that can alter dependency graphs without corporate transparency. Its routing identity is a control surface that, if modified, immediately shifts internet measurement data. This makes it a useful early signal for infrastructure analysts mapping new entrant behavior and registry transition mechanics.
The primary watchpoint is the creation of a public-facing corporate or infrastructure presence (website, PeeringDB, abuse contact). A secondary watchpoint is any change in the RIPE aut‑num object for AS199550 that confirms the current holder with an accurate timestamp. A tertiary watchpoint is the first BGP prefix announcement, which would transition the company from an ASN-only entity to an active routing actor.
Direct RIPE DB aut‑num and organisation objects for the current holder were not retrieved; a full RIPE DB history would confirm the transition date and responsible maintainer. Companies House direct record was not fetched, leaving some corporate detail unverified. Revenue, customer list, and operational staff remain unknown.
Sources
- Internet registry record - public-source identity and registry context for HIRAGI-LTD HIRAGI LTD.
- companiesintheuk.co.uk - The page lists HIRAGI LTD as company number 17195327, active, incorporated on 1 May 2026, and classified under SIC 63110 for data processing, hosting and related activities.
- radar.cloudflare.com - Cloudflare Radar identifies AS199550 as HIRAGI LTD under Europe and the United Kingdom and shows recent network-level traffic/adoption metrics.
- APNIC registry record - APNIC Labs lists AS199550 as HIRAGI-LTD - HIRAGI LTD in United Kingdom AS measurement tables.
- bgp.tools - BGP.tools' Pipe Networks page lists AS199550/HIRAGI LTD as a peer and downstream with IPv4 visibility in Pipe Networks' connectivity tables.
- bgp.tools - BGP.tools' EPIX.Katowice page lists AS199550 on the exchange member table with IPv4 178.216.40.96, IPv6 2001:7f8:5b::96, and a displayed 40 Gbps entry.
- ipinfo.io - Older IPinfo ASN data still showed AS199550 as ComNet Multimedia Sp. z o.o., supporting a freshness and holder-transition watchpoint rather than the current subject identity.
- Registry RDAP / WHOIS record - An older WHOIS mirror for AS199550 showed the RIPE aut-num as ASN-Danex and organisation ComNet Multimedia Sp. z o.o., reinforcing the need to verify direct RIPE DB history for any holder transition.
Domain of operation
HIRAGI LTD is a newly registered UK private limited company operating autonomous system AS199550, with a sparse but visible internet infrastructure footprint observable through routing measurement platforms and an exchange presence at EPIX.Katowice. The company's impact stems from its potential to change attribution and reachability without prior corporate transparency, given the absence of a public website or abuse contact and stale registry records hinting at a prior holder.
- Internet registry record: public-source identity and registry context for HIRAGI-LTD HIRAGI LTD. Evidence basis: source-a900dbbaccd7
Timeline
- HIRAGI LTD public evidence observed
The company is tracked because its sparse public footprint—no website, no abuse contact, no announced prefixes in this evidence bundle—combined with stale registry records pointing to a previous holder, creates a watchpoint for analysts monitoring new entrants, registry transitions, and shifts in routing visibility that could affect incident attribution and dependency maps.
At A Glance
- Name: HIRAGI LTD
- Type: Digital infrastructure institution
- Base: United Kingdom, Europe
- Profile focus: Institution
What It Does
- public operating records
- official service pages
- source-backed relationship updates
Why It Matters
- If HIRAGI LTD modifies its RIPE database objects, RPKI ROAs, BGP announcements, or exchange port configurations, the resulting changes will immediately alter how downstream networks and measurement platforms observe its traffic, potentially disrupting incident escalation paths and dependency assumptions before any corporate disclosure.
- Operational criticality: Medium
- Time horizon: Next quarter
What To Watch
- official company sources
- public registries
- operator-published records
Track verified source updates, role changes, and current public evidence.
If HIRAGI LTD modifies its RIPE database objects, RPKI ROAs, BGP announcements, or exchange port configurations, the resulting changes will immediately alter how downstream networks and measurement platforms observe its traffic, potentially disrupting incident escalation paths and dependency assumptions before any corporate disclosure.
Longer-term relevance depends on verified operating, policy, and relationship changes.
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Join Leadership AlliancePublic Sources and Linked Organizations
| Organization | Link | Related organization | Confidence | Why it matters | Source | Caveat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIRAGI LTD | partners with | EPIX.Katowice | High | Public source supports this object-to-object relationship. | Lists AS199550 with IPv4 178.216.40.96, IPv6 2001:7f8:5b::96, and 40 Gbps port. | Low risk |
Public View
If HIRAGI LTD modifies its RIPE database objects, RPKI ROAs, BGP announcements, or exchange port configurations, the resulting changes will immediately alter how downstream networks and measurement platforms observe its traffic, potentially disrupting incident escalation paths and dependency assumptions before any corporate disclosure.
Watchpoints
- HIRAGI LTD represents a class of minimal-footprint network operators that can alter dependency graphs without corporate transparency.
- Its routing identity is a control surface that, if modified, immediately shifts internet measurement data.
- This makes it a useful early signal for infrastructure analysts mapping new entrant behavior and registry transition mechanics.
Caveats
- Public evidence is used only for source-backed claims.
- Private control or contract claims require separate public support.
FAQ
Why does BTW track HIRAGI LTD?
The company is tracked because its sparse public footprint—no website, no abuse contact, no announced prefixes in this evidence bundle—combined with stale registry records pointing to a previous holder, creates a watchpoint for analysts monitoring new entrants, registry transitions, and shifts in routing visibility that could affect incident attribution and dependency maps.
What evidence supports the profile?
public-source identity and registry context for HIRAGI-LTD HIRAGI LTD.
What should readers watch next?
HIRAGI LTD represents a class of minimal-footprint network operators that can alter dependency graphs without corporate transparency.






