Summary

  • Version 3 of the RIR Governance Document, published as a FINAL DRAFT on 1 September 2026 and delivered by the ASO Address Council to the NRO Executive Council on 28 July 2026, defines a multi-stage derecognition process in Article 6 — but the document remains a draft, with approval and adoption planned for Q4 2026 and not yet completed (NRO, Version 3 page; NRO timeline).
  • Under Article 6, an RIR may lose recognition only for material non-compliance with Section 4.1 requirements after a reasonable remedial opportunity; Section 6.2 presumes rehabilitation first, requiring a Rehabilitation Plan and cure period before any final decision; and Section 6.7(c) bars ICANN from derecognizing an RIR without a Proposal supported by Derecognition Assessments from at least two-thirds of the other RIRs, excluding the subject (NRO, Version 3 page).
  • The ICP-2-era compliance regime the draft would replace already shows how high the practical trigger sits: an RIR-initiated compliance review requires a unanimous decision of the other RIRs, and ICANN's letters of 3 and 16 July 2025 confirm that even during the AFRINIC governance crisis — receivership, a winding-up petition and contested Board elections — no compliance review of AFRINIC had been initiated (ICANN, Implementation and Assessment Procedures; ICANN letter, 16 July 2025).
  • The AFRINIC episode is the closest the system has produced to a live test, and it tested nothing: ICANN reserved rights rather than acted, and AFRINIC's own member update describes the litigation as an attempt to paralyze the registry — a party characterization, contested by counterparties, that nonetheless documents a multi-year governance failure with no formal compliance proceeding commenced (AFRINIC member update; ICANN letter, 3 July 2025).
  • The honest reading is that Article 6 is procedurally reachable but not demonstrated operable: each safeguard that makes unilateral removal impossible also gives peers, and the subject RIR itself, lawful means to slow or block enforcement. What would have to change for the remedy to be credible is a question the draft does not answer, and one that adoption in Q4 2026 will not settle by itself.

The instrument and its status

For twenty-five years, the governance of the Regional Internet Registries rested on ICP-2, a short document adopted by ICANN on 4 June 2001. The replacement now moving through the Number Resource Organization's process is far more detailed. The ASO Address Council — which serves as the NRO Number Council — completed Version 3 and formally delivered it to the NRO Executive Council on 28 July 2026, transferring responsibility for finalization (ASO/ICANN). The NRO's process timeline lists "Drafting Final Version of RIR Governance Document" as in process through Q3 and Q4 2026 and "Approval and Adoption" as an upcoming Q4 2026 step (NRO timeline). As of 1 October 2026, nothing in Article 6 binds anyone.

That status matters for the operability question in a specific way: an unadopted remedy cannot have a track record, and the record that does exist — under the current ICP-2 procedures — is the best available evidence of how the system behaves when a registry appears to be failing.

What Article 6 actually requires

Article 6 is built as a sequence of gates. Section 6.1 permits derecognition only where an RIR "does not continue to materially meet all the requirements specified in Section 4.1" and, despite a reasonable remedial opportunity, "remains materially non-compliant." Section 6.2 establishes a presumption in favor of helping a non-compliant RIR remedy the failure, and requires a Rehabilitation Plan and a reasonable cure period before any final derecognition decision. Section 6.3 permits a Proposal for Derecognition to come from three sources only: any RIR, a group of Members of the subject RIR meeting a threshold of 25% of total Members or 2,000 Members (whichever is lesser), or ICANN. Section 6.7(c) then hard-gates the outcome: ICANN "shall have no power to Derecognize an RIR unless it has first received a Proposal to do so that is supported by the Derecognition Assessments of at least 2/3s of the RIRs, excluding the subject RIR" (NRO, Version 3 page).

Two further provisions shape operability. Section 6.6(i) requires ICANN, where sufficient evidence of non-compliance exists but the RIR has not had a cure opportunity, to require a Rehabilitation Plan and restart the review processes afterward — meaning even a well-evidenced case routes back to rehabilitation first. Article 7 prevents amendment of the document while a Proposal for Derecognition is pending or during a Temporary Emergency Continuity Arrangement, freezing the rulebook mid-proceeding (NRO, Version 3 page). The ASO rationale report describes the design intent: a "more detailed Derecognition process that emphasizes rehabilitation as the preferred path," alignment of key steps with the Recognition process, publication of decisions and supporting documents, and the two-thirds threshold excluding the subject RIR (ASO/ICANN rationale).

The record so far: a remedy never tested

Under the operative ICP-2-era procedures, adopted in their current form on 24 December 2024, the enforcement trigger is even higher than anything Article 6 proposes. An RIR-initiated compliance review requires "the other RIRs may, by unanimous decision" to request that ICANN review the subject RIR — unanimity among four peers. ICANN retains the ability to initiate a compliance review on its own initiative where it reasonably believes a subject RIR puts the secure operation of unique identifier systems at risk, but outcomes in the documented procedure run from no further action to agreed restoration timelines, not removal (ICANN, Implementation and Assessment Procedures). The NRO's ICP-2 FAQ likewise describes the review process and its scope (NRO, ICP-2 FAQ).

The AFRINIC episode shows how those powers performed under maximum stress. Through receivership proceedings in Mauritius, a winding-up petition brought by Cloud Innovation Ltd, contested Board elections and injunction battles, AFRINIC's governance was in visible dispute for years. ICANN's open letter of 16 July 2025 states plainly: "ICANN has not yet initiated a compliance review of AFRINIC under the Implementation and Assessment Procedures," while reserving all rights to do so; the 3 July 2025 letter reiterates the same reservation in language about the Board of Directors' election allegations (ICANN letter, 16 July 2025; ICANN letter, 3 July 2025). AFRINIC's own member update describes "a relentless barrage of legal warfare" following its attempt to bring Cloud Innovation Ltd into compliance with its Registration Service Agreement, and points to the September 2025 Board elections with high member turnout as the moment duties resumed under Mauritian company law — an account that is a party position, contested by counterparties, but which no party disputes as describing a prolonged crisis (AFRINIC member update).

Putting the two records side by side yields the central finding of this article: in the one scenario that came closest to demanding enforcement, the system's actual response was correspondence reserving rights, and the compliance mechanism was never commenced. No RIR has ever faced a live compliance review, and no derecognition proceeding has ever been initiated under any version of the framework. The remedy exists on paper; it has no operating history.

Why the design makes exercise structurally difficult

This is not a claim of bad faith, and the evidence does not support one. The ICANN letters show process inaction, not proven unwillingness; the reserved-rights language is consistent with a body that judged litigation-sensitive caution preferable to escalation. But the design itself explains why the remedy stays unused, and it is worth naming the mechanisms precisely, because each one is defensible in isolation.

First, the trigger is evidentiary and relative. "Material non-compliance" with Section 4.1 after a reasonable remedial opportunity is a standard that any contested case will litigate extensively before the first gate opens. Second, rehabilitation-first sequencing means the subject RIR controls the clock inside the cure period; a registry that files a Rehabilitation Plan and makes incremental progress can extend the timeline indefinitely, and Section 6.6(i) routes even strong cases back through that path. Third, the two-thirds peer gate excluding the subject RIR means the deciding votes belong to four organizations with every structural incentive to avoid establishing a precedent that could one day be applied to them — the same consensus dynamic the unanimity rule under the current procedures makes explicit. Fourth, Article 7's amendment freeze, while protective against rule-changing under fire, also means any defect discovered in Article 6 mid-proceeding cannot be repaired until the proceeding concludes (NRO, Version 3 page).

The ASO rationale report frames these as features: publication of decisions and documents, safeguards against misuse of the Compliance Review process, and a two-thirds threshold that makes unilateral removal impossible (ASO/ICANN rationale). Both framings are true. The machinery prevents ICANN from removing a registry alone, and it equally ensures that the peer community as a whole must affirmatively choose enforcement — a choice with no precedent and high coalition cost.

What would make the remedy credible

The draft does not answer the operability question, and adoption will not answer it either. Three observable developments would. First, any actual commencement: a Compliance Review initiated under either the current procedures or the v3 framework against any RIR, for any stated grounds, would convert the remedy from theory to practice and generate the operating record the system currently lacks.

Second, publication discipline: the v3 design requires decisions and supporting documents to be published; whether that happens for interim steps — assessments, rehabilitation milestones, refusals to support a Proposal — will show whether the process is accountable in progress or only at its endpoints. Third, the Member-initiation path: the 25%-or-2,000-member threshold exists precisely so that internal constituencies can trigger review when peers will not; whether members of a contested registry can actually organize, file and survive the procedural filters is the least-tested and most consequential branch of the design.

Until one of those occurs, the accurate public statement is the cautious one: the Governance Document writes a rulebound, rehabilitation-first, peer-gated removal process; the record shows the nearest analogous mechanism went unused through the system's most severe governance crisis; and the gap between the two is a legitimate object of scrutiny, not an accusation against any named institution.

The document's own title — recognition, operation, derecognition — promises a complete lifecycle. The last third of that promise remains, as of 1 October 2026, an untested design awaiting both adoption and its first user.