Summary

  • The Digital Networks Act proposal assigns preparation of the Union Preparedness Plan to the new Office for Digital Networks while BEREC formally adopts the report.
  • That division can combine analytical capacity with regulator authority. The final rules should make the evidence chain, review and authorship visible.

A resilience plan begins before anyone votes on it. Someone decides which network information to request, how to describe a bottleneck, which failure scenarios deserve attention and which recommendations make it into the draft. Under the European Commission’s Digital Networks Act proposal, those tasks would sit partly with a new office whose name suggests support, while the adoption decision stays with BEREC.

The distinction is written into the proposal’s verbs. Article 7 says the Office for Digital Networks (ODN) prepares the draft Union Preparedness Plan for Digital Infrastructures. Article 6 says BEREC adopts that plan as a report. The plan would assess network architecture, capacity, capability and use; set out operational recommendations; and describe crisis-management practices. It is not a transfer of BEREC’s formal adoption power. It is an allocation of work before that power is exercised.

That work matters because the proposal gives the plan a place in operating decisions. Article 5 would require providers and authorities to take “utmost account” of it when cooperating to preserve network availability and capability. Providers and public-safety answering points would also take the plan into consideration for critical communications, emergency communications and public warnings. A report does not become a regulation by using those words, but its recommendations could shape how national authorities and operators explain their resilience choices.

The proposed evidence path is detailed. National regulatory authorities would collect information every two years about the architecture, capacity, capability and use of relevant public networks and services. Requests must be reasoned and proportionate, and limited to what is strictly necessary for resilience and preparedness. The information goes to the ODN. The office would prepare the plan in close cooperation with the Commission and the NIS Cooperation Group, with consultation of ENISA and relevant crisis-response and civil-protection authorities where appropriate.

The proposal requires protection of classified information and aggregated presentation that avoids revealing exact locations of sensitive assets.

The ODN would therefore sit where evidence becomes a shared account of risk. That does not make the office a regulator. BEREC’s Board of Regulators would still adopt the plan, and the proposal says the ODN must support BEREC without prejudice to its independence and decision-making powers. The point is narrower: a body that selects, organizes and drafts evidence can influence what decision-makers see first, even when another body retains the final act. The proposal does not establish that BEREC would rubber-stamp an ODN draft. It leaves readers with a governance question about how the Board can examine and change the analysis.

Working groups add a second test. Under Article 140, the BEREC Board may establish groups after consulting the ODN. The Board appoints chairs; the provision allows the chair to come, where possible, from national regulators, RSPB members or the ODN. ODN and Commission experts may participate, and ODN staff are to contribute to regulatory work as well as provide administrative support. Article 146 also gives the ODN responsibility for a recurring single-market report. BEREC and the Radio Spectrum Policy Body must approve its draft before publication.

Some of this builds on the existing arrangement. Regulation 2018/1971 already permits BEREC Office staff to join working groups and contribute to regulatory work; the Board of Regulators appoints their chairs from national regulatory authorities where possible. So the argument cannot rest on the idea that office staff have never influenced technical preparation. The proposed change is more specific: ODN may be among the possible chairs, the Board must consult it before establishing groups, and the office receives an explicit role in preparing the resilience plan and producing analysis used in later EU policy.

The Commission presents the design as an enhancement of the current governance setup. Its public explanation says BEREC remains an important actor and that the renamed office will support both BEREC and the new Radio Spectrum Policy Body. The Commission’s external evaluation, covering 2019–2023, found that BEREC outputs largely met stakeholders’ needs and added EU value through the combined expertise of national regulators. It also identified staffing, data-management and coordination improvements. That is a reason to add capacity; it does not establish how the future allocation of drafting work will operate.

BEREC’s June opinion reaches a different institutional conclusion. It argues that assigning preparation of the plan and other duties to the ODN, combined with possible ODN chairs and other changes, risks moving the office beyond support. BEREC recommends that the body itself take on the plan and single-market report with ODN assistance. BEREC has a direct stake in the powers being allocated, so its position deserves attribution. Its interest does not make the concerns irrelevant; it makes the proposal text the necessary check.

The final rules should preserve both sides of the design. The ODN can contribute specialist staff and coordinate evidence across institutions. BEREC can retain authority over the conclusions its independent regulators adopt. A published record could identify the sources and limits of the data, how the draft changed during review, which recommendations the Board accepted or revised, and any material dissent. Security-sensitive detail would stay protected; accountability does not require publishing network maps that expose vulnerable assets.

The Parliament’s procedure file still listed the proposal as awaiting a committee decision on 10 October 2026. The words can still change. The useful test for amendments is concrete: can a regulator, operator or reader tell who prepared a claim, what evidence supports it, who reviewed it, and which institution adopted the recommendation? If so, technical support can increase capacity without obscuring responsibility. If the final text leaves that trail implicit, formal adoption will remain with BEREC while practical influence becomes harder to inspect.

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