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Organisation profile

Organisation

TELECOM OVH SAS

The BTW directory brings together public records about TELECOM OVH SAS.

The available evidence covers Legal type: Private company, Network identity: AS35540, Services: 2, and Related networks: 13.

Source description TELECOM OVH SAS is recorded as a network operator in FR. Current public evidence covers 1 ASN, one supporting public reference; services, assets, and relationship context should be read with that evidence boundary.

Latest 2026-07-23
  • 1ASNs
  • 13Relationships
  • 2Services
Legal type
Private company
Network identity
AS35540
Services
2
Related networks
13

Confidence

1
Public role
TELECOM OVH SAS is recorded as a network operator in FR. Current public evidence covers 1 ASN, one supporting public reference; services, assets, and relationship context should be read with that evidence boundary.
Information type
TELECOM OVH SAS is the organisation operating autonomous system AS35540 in FR. Public evidence also covers one supporting public reference. BTW tracks it to pin down the responsible operator, the services these number resources support, and the upstream, peer, and customer relationships behind its routing.

Related details

Last updated: 2026-06-02

Current status

Legal type:Private companyNot yet assessed

Network identity

1
AS35540

Services

2
Service:Managed networkNot yet assessed· 1 record
Service:Internet service providerNot yet assessed· 1 record

Related networks

13
Relationship topology: TELECOM OVH SASOVH OVH SASRIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CEN…RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CEN…AS16276Abuse-C RoleHOPUS HOPUS SASHOPUS HOPUS SASAS44530TELECOM OVH SAS
This entityupstream / providerdownstream / customerpeercorporate / legalother

The entity sits in the centre; its customers fan out to the left and its upstream providers to the right (arrows show transit direction). Scroll or use the buttons to zoom · drag the background to pan · click a node to open it in the directory.

Data as of 2026-07

The entity sits on the left and its connections fan out by role on the right; the graph shows each group’s most confident connections, and the full list below carries every relationship.

Full list

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE
peerMedium confidence· Latest 2026-07
OVH OVH SASMultiple relationships recorded
peerMedium confidence· 22 records· 2 medium· Latest 2026-06downstreamHigh confidence· Latest 2026-06
HOPUS HOPUS SAS
downstreamMedium confidence· 12 records· 12 unrated· Latest 2026-06
Abuse-C Role
downstreamHigh confidence· Latest 2026-06
RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTREAS16276Multiple relationships recorded
peerMedium confidence· 2 records· 2 medium· Latest 2026-07downstreamHigh confidence· 11 records· 11 unrated· Latest 2026-06
HOPUS HOPUS SASAS44530
downstreamMedium confidence· 12 records· 12 unrated· Latest 2026-06

Related research

4
  • A pane de backbone da OVHcloud em 2021 transformou o isolamento entre BGP e OSPF em um teste de responsabilização

    Uma alteração de manutenção no roteador de Vint Hill, na Virgínia, mostrou como uma transição entre domínios de roteamento pode ultrapassar rapidamente o escopo pretendido. O caso não foi um ataque, um sequestro de rotas ou um vazamento interdomínio clássico: foi uma falha de controle durante a redistribuição de informações de BGP para OSPF.

    Primary articlePublished 2026-08-02
  • O ataque da botnet Mirai à OVH em 2016 transformou a capacidade de mitigação de DDoS em um teste de responsabilização

    Ao informar tráfego superior a um terabit por segundo durante a primeira grande onda da Mirai, a OVHcloud transformou um número espetacular em uma pergunta operacional: o provedor conseguia medir a inundação, ativar a mitigação, preservar o tráfego legítimo e demonstrar que o serviço havia realmente se recuperado?

    Primary articlePublished 2026-08-01
  • OVH's 2017 Optical-Network Failure Made Redundancy Independence an Accountability Test

    On 9 November 2017, OVH lost the optical paths connecting its Roubaix hosting site to major external points of presence. The event showed why redundant paths and saved configuration do not amount to resilient network infrastructure when they still depend on one software state, supervisory system or recovery procedure.

    Primary articlePublished 2026-07-29
  • The OVHcloud fire showed that data locality is not disaster separation

    The March 2021 fire at OVHcloud's Strasbourg campus turned a physical incident into permanent data loss and a Europe-wide service shock. Its lasting accountability lesson is not that cloud customers should simply have bought "a backup," but that providers and customers must identify the real failure domain behind every locality, redundancy, and recovery claim, then prove that a usable copy and the means to restore it survive the same building, site, account, and operator crisis.

    Primary articlePublished 2026-07-10