The Boeing Company

Два инцидента с литий-ионными аккумуляторами за девять дней выявили разрыв между сертифицированной безопасностью Boeing 787 и поведением установленных батарей. Первый закончился пожаром в припаркованном самолёте Japan Airlines в Бостоне; второй вынудил Boeing 787 All Nippon Airways уйти на запасной аэродром в Такамацу и провести эвакуацию.

Система MCAS на Boeing 737 MAX — дело о рисках и подотчётности: две катастрофы, глобальная приостановка полётов, расследования, уголовные урегулирования и возврат в эксплуатацию показали, как критически важная автоматика перераспределяет контроль между производителем, регулятором, авиакомпанией, пилотом и пассажиром. Архив важен: сертификационные доказательства — не бумаги, а гарантия, что проектные допущения, обучение и исправления защищают тех, кто не может проверить автоматику, несущую их.

Two lithium-ion battery events in nine days exposed a gap between the safety proposition certified for the Boeing 787 and the behavior of its installed batteries. The first produced fire in a parked Japan Airlines aircraft at Boston; the second forced an All Nippon Airways 787 to divert and evacuate at Takamatsu. Investigators later found that a single-cell internal short could escalate into cell-to-cell thermal runaway, while the initiating defect could remain destroyed or unresolved. The fleet returned through a three-layer redesign that reduced initiation risk, impeded propagation, and contained and vented a failure outside the aircraft. That was an effective operational recovery, but it

Boeing 737 MAX MCAS is a risk and accountability case because two fatal crashes, a global grounding, public investigations, criminal-resolution records, regulator return-to-service actions, and continuing safety-governance scrutiny showed how safety-critical automation can shift practical control among manufacturer, regulator, airline, pilot, and passenger. The public record matters because certification evidence is not merely paperwork; it is the proof that design assumptions, human factors, training, delegation, and repair decisions protect people who cannot inspect the automation carrying them.

The opening in the side of Alaska Airlines flight 1282 was the visible failure. The harder accountability question lay behind it: how a safety-critical configuration could be changed on a factory floor without a durable record, restored without the required inspection, accepted behind finished cabin walls, and delivered into passenger service.