The Boeing Company

Dos eventos de baterías de iones de litio en nueve días expusieron una brecha entre la proposición de seguridad certificada para el Boeing 787 y el comportamiento de sus baterías instaladas. El primero produjo fuego en un avión estacionado de Japan Airlines en Boston; el segundo obligó a un Boeing 787 de All Nippon Airways a desviarse y evacuar en Takamatsu.

El MCAS del Boeing 737 MAX es un caso de riesgo y responsabilidad debido a dos accidentes fatales, una suspensión global, investigaciones públicas, resoluciones penales, acciones de retorno al servicio de los reguladores y un escrutinio continuo de la gobernanza de seguridad que mostró cómo la automatización de seguridad crítica puede transferir el control práctico entre fabricante, regulador, aerolínea, piloto y pasajero.

Two lithium-ion battery events in nine days exposed a gap between the safety proposition certified for the Boeing 787 and the behavior of its installed batteries. The first produced fire in a parked Japan Airlines aircraft at Boston; the second forced an All Nippon Airways 787 to divert and evacuate at Takamatsu. Investigators later found that a single-cell internal short could escalate into cell-to-cell thermal runaway, while the initiating defect could remain destroyed or unresolved. The fleet returned through a three-layer redesign that reduced initiation risk, impeded propagation, and contained and vented a failure outside the aircraft. That was an effective operational recovery, but it

Boeing 737 MAX MCAS is a risk and accountability case because two fatal crashes, a global grounding, public investigations, criminal-resolution records, regulator return-to-service actions, and continuing safety-governance scrutiny showed how safety-critical automation can shift practical control among manufacturer, regulator, airline, pilot, and passenger. The public record matters because certification evidence is not merely paperwork; it is the proof that design assumptions, human factors, training, delegation, and repair decisions protect people who cannot inspect the automation carrying them.

The opening in the side of Alaska Airlines flight 1282 was the visible failure. The harder accountability question lay behind it: how a safety-critical configuration could be changed on a factory floor without a durable record, restored without the required inspection, accepted behind finished cabin walls, and delivered into passenger service.