Quando a política .APP virou código de navegador

Resumo

• ICANN controla programa, IANA raiz, registro inscrição e browser o cliente.
• O navegador eleva HTTP, depois resolve DNS e valida certificado.

Análise

Após alerta e avaliação, leilão resolveu contenda. Charleston Road contratou, entrou na raiz e transmitiu regras. O preload vive no software: reescreve URL antes de carregar; DNS e TLS vêm depois. Compliance, registro, titular e browser só remediam suas próprias camadas.

Fontes

• http://service.app/path`
• https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/developers-tools/introducing-app-more-secure-home-apps-web/
• https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/
• https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/%2B/63.0.3239.118/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6797
• https://gac.icann.org/work-products/public/app-au-33325-2012-11-20.pdf
• https://gtldresult.icann.org/applicationstatus/applicationchangehistory/1343
• https://gtldresult.icann.org/applicationstatus/applicationdetails/1343
• https://gtldresult.icann.org/applicationstatus/stringcontentionstatus%3Adownloadauctionreport/39
• https://hstspreload.org/
• https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/registry-agreements/app/app-agmt-html-14may15-en.htm
• https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/program-status/application-results/ie-1-1138-33325-en.pdf
• https://portal.icann.org/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=00P6100000NjL8nEAF
• https://security.googleblog.com/2017/09/broadening-hsts-to-secure-more-of-web.html
• https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/crr-rra-app-form.pdf
• https://www.chromium.org/hsts/
• https://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/app.html
• https://www.iana.org/reports/c.2.9.2.d/20150629-app
• https://www.icann.org/en/news/correspondence/falvey-to-willett-06apr13-en
• https://www.icann.org/en/registry-agreements/details/app
• https://www.registry.google/policies/registration/app/