RIPE NCC · RIR-Beobachtung
Beginnen Sie hier mit der Dokumentation zu jedem einzelnen Vorschlag: Was änderte sich, warum war dies von Bedeutung, wer argumentierte wofür, wie entwickelten sich die Positionen, was wurde beschlossen und wo weist die Beleglage noch Lücken auf?
Quellenbelegte Fakten
Wer hat die Debatte tatsächlich geprägt?
BTW-Analyse
Aus den gelieferten verifizierten Fakten lässt sich keine Veränderung der Policy rekonstruieren. Die Policy-Chronologie ist leer, und es liegt kein verifiziertes Annahme-, Ablehnungs-, Änderungs- oder Implementierungsergebnis vor.
Der Gegenstand und die Konfliktlinien einer Debatte sind nicht bestimmbar, weil keine Diskussionsbeiträge, Stellungnahmen oder Akteursrollen erfasst wurden. Die verifizierten Kennzahlen weisen 0 Nachrichten, 0 Diskussionsteilnehmer und 0 formale Akteure aus.
Weder eine empirisch dokumentierte Diskussion noch eine formale Entscheidung ist in den gelieferten Fakten nachgewiesen. Insbesondere darf aus dem Fehlen erfasster Aktivität nicht auf Annahme, Ablehnung, Konsens oder Implementierung geschlossen werden.
Top-1-, Top-5- und Top-10-Nachrichtenanteile sowie der HHI sind jeweils 0; zugleich beträgt die Teilnehmerzahl 0. Deshalb belegen diese Werte keine breite oder gleichmäßige Beteiligung, sondern sind mangels beobachteter Grundgesamtheit nicht als Konzentrationsmaß interpretierbar.
Ein personeller, institutioneller oder prozeduraler Engpass ist nicht identifizierbar. Es fehlen Chronologie, Beiträge, Akteursrollen und Entscheidungsereignisse, anhand derer kontrollierende oder verzögernde Stellen bestimmt werden könnten. Die Nullwerte sind kein Beleg dafür, dass kein Chokepoint existierte.
Resource coverage and investigation boundary · Version 2 expressly includes unassigned IP address space and Autonomous System Numbers and limits investigation to suspected hijackers subject to RIPE policies. Version 1 instead expressly makes both parties' location irrelevant. This compares proposed coverage and does not establish present jurisdiction or an adopted enforcement rule.
The location of the resource holder or hijacker in such cases is irrelevant. A hijack constitutes a policy violation even if both parties are located outside of the RIPE NCC service region. The announcement of unallocated address space to third parties is also considered a policy violation and is evaluated according to the same parameters.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
A hijack of numbering resources or the announcement of unallocated or unassigned IP addressing space or Autonomous System Numbers to third parties are also considered a policy violation. Only reports in which the suspected hijacker is subject to RIPE policies can be investigated.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
More explicit exclusions for accidental events · Version 2 develops the distinction between accidental and deliberate conduct: clearly accidental cases are dismissed, BGP leaks are outside scope, and proven third-party manipulation of the alleged hijacker's infrastructure is not treated as intentional. Similar-looking prefixes and parallel legitimate announcements are not sufficient by themselves to prove intent. Version 1 gives general assessment factors without these express safeguards.
A distinction can be made between accidental or deliberate hijacks from available routing datasets, looking at parameters such as duration, recurrence, possible goals, and the size of hijacked blocks.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
BGP leaks are outside the scope of this policy. Any case strictly related to BGP leaks should be dismissed.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Directly affected claimants and six-month evidence limit · Version 2 permits reports only from directly affected networks: legitimate resource holders or networks that received the hijacked route or AS path. It excludes reports by unaffected parties and evidence older than six months at submission. Version 1 relies on external reports without stating these limits; both versions exclude pre-implementation events.
It must therefore rely on external parties, both to report hijacks and determine whether they are deliberate.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
A report is not admissible if the person reporting it was not affected in any way by the hijack. Evidence older than six months, counted from the time a report is submitted, cannot be considered or included in any expert report.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Earlier notice and treatment of connected networks · Version 2 makes reported routes or ASNs public to reduce duplicate reports and notifies identified parties early so they can respond and mitigate harm. It also provides for informational notice to direct upstream or transit providers and investigation of related organisations. Such notice is not a formal warning; experts are separately prohibited from adding accused parties to the case. Version 1 mainly provides notice when the judgement report is sent to the suspected hijacker.
A report containing an expert judgement on the case will be sent to the suspected hijacker.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Information regarding the hijacked routes/ASNs reported will be made publicly available to limit the risk of duplicate reports being submitted. The involved parties will be notified as soon as they are identified. This will allow them to provide any relevant information and mitigate the hijack, avoiding further damages and possibly false claims.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Longer initial assessment with an express dismissal consequence · Version 2 extends the expert judgement deadline from four to six weeks after receipt of the report and expressly requires dismissal if it is missed. The retained Version 1 states the four-week deadline without that dismissal rule.
Experts from this pool will provide a judgement regarding each reported case, no later than four weeks from the moment the report was received.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Experts from this pool will provide a judgement regarding each reported case, no later than six weeks from the moment the report was received. If this judgement report is not completed within six weeks, the case will be dismissed.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Defined expert qualifications and eligibility · Version 2 adds an open biennial selection process, suggested BGP experience, support from three networks in three economies under different LIR sponsorships, and a four-consecutive-year service limit followed by a two-year break. Proposal authors and active RIPE working-group chairs cannot serve as experts. Version 1 only requires the RIPE NCC to define a worldwide expert pool.
The RIPE NCC will define a pool of worldwide experts who can assess whether reported BGP hijacks constitute policy violations.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
To join the pool of experts, a candidate will need a statement support from three different networks (ASes) from three different economies within the RIPE NCC service region, which are within different LIR sponsorships. The authors of this proposal and active RIPE WG Chairs are not eligible to become experts.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Multi-expert panels and case-integrity safeguards · Version 2 requires at least three experts per case and phase, with any larger panel having an odd number and the same size used across cases. It adds random assignment, confidential panel identities, impartiality declarations, appeal confidentiality, continuity and replacement rules, legal insurance and a minimum available pool twice the per-case minimum. These replace Version 1's largely unspecified expert arrangement.
The RIPE NCC will define a pool of worldwide experts who can assess whether reported BGP hijacks constitute policy violations.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
The minimum number of experts per case and phase will be three. If a larger number is necessary, it must be odd, and the community will be informed of the reasons for the change. The experts for each case/phase will be chosen at random, to ensure a balanced sharing of cases.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Unanimity and procedural independence · Version 2 adds a sufficiency check before assignment, a response opportunity for the suspected hijacker and a joint expert report. An intentional-hijack finding requires unanimity. RIR staff cannot sit on the panel, and neither the RIPE NCC nor claimants may appeal the experts' decisions. These safeguards are not specified in Version 1's short lines-of-action provision.
Experts from this pool will provide a judgement regarding each reported case, no later than four weeks from the moment the report was received.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
For an event to be identified as an intentional hijack, there must be unanimity between all experts on the case. Experts cannot add accused parties to a case.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
A separate unanimous panel for appeals · Version 2 replaces review by an alternative expert with a different panel of at least three experts. All reviewing experts must agree to maintain an intentional-hijack finding; otherwise the case is dismissed. The maximum two-week appeal-filing and four-week review periods remain, with finality after review.
If an appeal is filed, an alternative expert will review this for a maximum of four weeks. The results of this review are final and cannot be further appealed.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
If an appeal is filed, an alternative set of experts (a minimum of three) will review the report for a maximum of four weeks. In order to maintain a ruling of “intentional hijack”, all experts involved in the review need to agree that this has occurred.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Ratification moves from the board to the experts · Version 2 replaces RIPE NCC Executive Board ratification with unanimous ratification by all experts involved, after a two-week public consultation. Without unanimity the report is archived, and experts may decline ratification on the basis of undisclosed information or consultation input. Ratification still waits for an appeal to finish.
Once the report has been published, any policy violation will be ratified by the RIPE NCC Executive Board. Otherwise, the complaint/report will be archived.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Once the report has been published, any policy violation will need to be ratified by all experts involved in the case, following a two-week public consultation on the report. If ratification is not declared unanimously, the report will be archived.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Transition arrangements and existing bogons · Version 2 adds six months of warning-only treatment for non-malicious announcements of unassigned resources and excludes bogons already present when implementation begins. Version 1 states only that eligible hijacks must occur after implementation. These are proposed transition protections, not evidence that an implementation date was reached.
Only hijacking events that occur after this policy has been implemented are eligible to be considered.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
As soon as the policy implementation is completed, a transition period of six months will be established. This will allow organisations that announce unassigned address space or Autonomous System Numbers (due to operational errors or other non-malicious reasons) to receive only a warning.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Protection of legacy and uninvolved PI resource holders · Version 2 expressly preserves legacy registration, while allowing possible restrictions on other RIPE NCC services in the repeated-violation circumstances described later. Uninvolved PI holders are protected from deregistration and may change sponsoring LIRs; sponsorship alone does not make the LIR responsible for a customer's hijack. Version 1 has no comparable resource-holder safeguards.
There must be consequences for hijacking for members or individuals/organisations that have a service agreement (either directly or indirectly) with the RIPE NCC.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Holders of Provider Independent resources that are sponsored by an LIR that is found have committed a deliberate hijack will not have their resources de-registered and will be able to find a new sponsoring LIR (provided they were not involved). In the same way, a sponsoring LIR is not responsible if its customer is found to have committed a hijack.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Repeated violations rather than a single violation for closure · Version 2 expressly links possible closure procedures to regular and repeated hijacking and says a single policy violation is not a basis it endorses for initiating LIR closure. Version 1 discusses refusing or ending contractual relationships in its rationale without stating this repeated-conduct threshold. This does not make closure automatic.
However, the RIPE NCC needs to be able to choose not to enter into (or maintain) a contractual relationship with people/companies that are performing BGP hijacks.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
This policy does not endorse the initiation of an LIR closure procedure on the basis of a single policy violation.Quellenbelegte Fakten ↗
Die Quellenabdeckung ist unvollständig.
Teilweise
Früheste Erfassung: 30.06.1992
Letzte Erfassung: 11.10.2026