• Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) operate with large budgets funded by compulsory membership fees, prompting questions about alignment with their core function.
• Critics argue that disproportionate spending on non-core activities shifts the financial burden to global internet users, including those in underserved regions.
RIR Budgets and the Core Function
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) are the organisations responsible for allocating and registering numerical internet resources such as IP addresses and autonomous system numbers. Unlike protocol designers or network operators, RIRs do not sell connectivity; they maintain technical databases that map network resources to holders around the world.
A recent analysis highlights a fundamental tension in how RIRs operate today. According to one perspective,
“Regional Internet Registries collectively employ hundreds of staff worldwide and operate with annual budgets in the hundreds of millions of dollars, all funded by mandatory membership fees.”
This model exists because RIRs hold a de-facto monopoly over the registration of number resources within their respective regions. Although necessary for coordination and uniqueness, the scale of expenditure has drawn scrutiny.
At its core, an RIR performs a single technical task: maintaining a registration database, which is relatively small and not complex by modern computing standards. As the commentary observes, “That database is small—on the order of a few gigabytes—and technically trivial to operate.” Historical context helps explain this: when RIRs were created in the 1990s, the fair distribution and need assessment of IPv4 addresses required substantial human involvement. Over decades, that role diminished as IPv4 scarcity yielded to market-driven transfers and as automation matured.
The expansion of RIR activities into training programmes, conferences and global travel has led to what some describe as expenditure detached from the technical necessity of resource registration. These additional activities are funded by compulsory fees that all members must pay, regardless of how much of the registries’ broader services they actually use.
Who Pays and Who Benefits?
The compulsory fee structure effectively spreads the cost of RIR operations across all organisations that need IP resources within each region. Because ISPs and network operators must register through their respective RIR to obtain addresses, those registration costs are often passed down through service pricing to end users. Critics argue this amounts to a global connectivity tax, borne even by users with minimal direct interaction with RIR governance.
As one critique puts it,
“Every Internet user, via their ISP, effectively pays a compulsory fee to five private organisations simply to obtain an IP address.”
This raises questions about equity, particularly for users in lower-income regions where connectivity costs already constitute a larger share of individual incomes.
In parts of Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, operators sometimes struggle to justify basic operational costs, yet resources are channelled towards global meetings and extensive administrative structures that may offer limited benefit to smaller members. The commentary suggests that in some cases, “registries spend millions annually just moving staff across continents to attend meetings, while operators in remote areas struggle to justify the basic fees required to stay connected.”
This divergence between cost and perceived benefit has led some operators and policy observers to call for greater transparency and accountability in RIR budgeting. While the technical coordination role of RIRs is widely accepted as necessary, there is less consensus on how much non-technical activity should be funded through mandatory fees.
Also Read: Breaking the centralised choke point: Why IP addresses must be decentralised
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Cost Structures, Policy and Broader Context
The specific fee structures and budgets vary by region and registry. For example, ARIN (American Registry for Internet Numbers), APNIC (Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre), RIPE NCC (Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre), LACNIC (Latin American and Caribbean IP Address Registry) and AFRINIC (African Network Information Centre) all derive revenue from resource registration and membership. In recent Number Resource Organization (NRO) financial reports, the proportional contribution to shared costs varied: RIPE NCC has accounted for around one-third of Registration Services Revenue, with ARIN and APNIC also representing significant shares.
This variation reflects both the size of the address holdings in each region and differences in organisational scale. It also raises questions about whether larger RIR budgets correlate with better service or simply reflect organisational choices about activities and staffing.
While RIRs are non-profit entities governed by community policies, they are not immune to broader debates about governance efficiency, equity and the role of global institutions in a decentralised internet. Some experts caution that high administrative and meeting costs may be unsustainable if they widen the gap between well-resourced stakeholders and smaller network operators.
As global internet numbering continues to evolve, including IPv6 adoption and market-based transfers of legacy resources, stakeholders may push for reforms in how RIRs structure their finances and justify expenses. For now, the discussion highlights a balance between necessary coordination and the need for members to question whether current cost structures remain aligned with core technical functions.
