- Critics warn CAIGA may worsen Africa’s security posture by consolidating power in governments rather than addressing AFRINIC’s systemic failures.
- Concerns grow that Smart Africa and ICANN are enabling political capture rather than strengthening the technical independence needed for real security.
A security ‘solution’ built on political power, not technical reform
Smart Africa’s Continental Africa Internet Governance Architecture (CAIGA) is being marketed as a stabilising force after AFRINIC’s years of governance breakdown. But the proposal contains no clear security framework and instead centres on state-led oversight, political endorsement mechanisms, and a Permanent Secretary positioned outside community accountability. None of this addresses the real, well-documented problems: AFRINIC’s weak audits, procedural failures, opaque decision-making, and years of mismanagement.
Security experts widely agree that internet security requires technical independence, not political direction. Yet CAIGA embeds political actors at the top of Africa’s internet infrastructure. This is not a cybersecurity upgrade — it is a governance takeover dressed in security language.
Also Read: ICANN’s AFRINIC hypocrisy: CEO Lindqvist admits to funding a state-led power grab
Smart Africa’s centralisation raises red flags—not confidence
Smart Africa describes CAIGA as a continental governance framework aimed at harmonising internet governance across Africa, but critics note the architecture effectively sidelines the multistakeholder community and replaces open participation with paid membership and government-first decision processes. Veteran governance expert Alice Munyua warns CAIGA is “a state takeover of the African internet,” one that risks making security subordinate to political priorities rather than technical best practice.
Smart Africa’s own meeting minutes, celebrating “7 of 8 coalition-backed candidates elected,” openly frame board influence as a political objective — not a security measure and certainly not a community-driven reform. This is precisely the environment in which security is compromised, not strengthened.
Also Read: CAIGA and digital sovereignty: What it means for African countries
ICANN’s role deepens mistrust
What alarms stakeholders further is ICANN’s participation. ICANN funded Smart Africa’s Internet Governance Blueprint — the very document enabling CAIGA’s structure — despite claiming neutrality and insisting it does not endorse political interference. ICANN cannot preach multistakeholder governance globally while bankrolling state-led governance experiments in Africa. Security cannot be safeguarded by institutions whose actions contradict their own principles.
Until ICANN explains why Africa is treated differently from other regions — and why its resources were used to legitimize CAIGA — trust in any “security improvements” will remain low.
