- ICANN pressures AFRINIC’s court-appointed receiver, demanding control over elections and IP allocations in defiance of Mauritian law.
- Lindqvist’s “quiet power grab” via ICP-2 bypasses community governance, eroding trust and weakening Africa’s bottom-up internet governance model.
In the halls of internet governance, a storm is unfolding. At its centre sits Kurtis Lindqvist, the newly installed CEO of ICANN, wielding the tools of global influence, and increasingly, legal intimidation, to reshape the future of Africa’s IP resource governance. His moves against AFRINIC, the regional Internet registry for Africa based in Mauritius, are a calculated project to seize control of a community-led institution. The implications are grave: a brazen overreach that tramples the rule of law in Mauritius, defies company law, and threatens the principle of bottom-up internet governance across Africa.
This is a pivotal moment for African internet autonomy. The crisis at AFRINIC is a moment when external forces, embodied by ICANN leadership, seek to wrest governance from its rightful stakeholders. The institutional failures have been real, but they do not justify turning to extra-legal pressure, courtroom threats, and constitutional abuses. Instead, they demand a reset grounded in the rule of law, not blunt power plays.
A brief setting of the scene: AFRINIC’s crisis
AFRINIC’s troubles are well documented. As the regional Internet registry (RIR) for Africa and adjoining islands, it is entrusted with distributing IPv4 and IPv6 address blocks and autonomous system (AS) numbers across the continent.
Yet the governance structure has been dysfunctional for years: internal disputes, legal challenges (notably with member Cloud Innovation Ltd.), board paralysis, and ultimately judicial receivership by the Supreme Court of Mauritius.
In 2022, the Mauritian Supreme Court dissolved AFRINIC’s board after concluding it lacked quorum and lawful authority. Since then, AFRINIC has operated under a court-appointed receiver, tasked with maintaining operations and preparing a fresh election.
That election, scheduled for June 2025, was abruptly annulled due to disputes over just a single proxy vote, in spite of many valid ballots being cast. The annulment was widely seen as an implosion of AFRINIC’s internal bylaws—the rules themselves lacked mechanisms to handle procedural ambiguity without voiding the entire vote.
Observers have flagged that the cancellation violated AFRINIC’s own Constitution (Bylaws) and undermined confidence in the registry’s legitimacy.
At the same time, ICANN has rushed in, demanding oversight, threatening sanctions, and pressing the Mauritian courts to compel the receiver to comply with its directives.
It is in that fraught context that Lindqvist’s actions must be understood—not as benign leadership, but as an assault on local process cloaked in procedural rhetoric.
ICANN’s lawless overreach: What Lindqvist has done
- Threatening the court-appointed receiver and undermining courts
Since his arrival at ICANN, Lindqvist has not contented himself with diplomatic letters, he has threatened a receiver whose authority is grounded in Mauritian court orders. In communications to Mr. Gowtamsingh Dabee (Mauritius’ court-appointed receiver over AFRINIC), Lindqvist repeatedly demands responses and compliance on election matters, and insists that ICANN’s engagement is not dependent on court leave.
He routinely frames the election annulment as insufficient response to ICANN concerns, insinuating that default or disobedience will have consequences.
On June 20, 2025, ICANN obtained a Mauritius Supreme Court ruling ordering the receiver to issue a communique to all resource members, reconstitute the Nomination Committee, and document remedial steps. But ICANN’s own pleadings openly admitted that it has “no locus standi” to file the application—yet the court accepted the application because ICANN “has an objective … to ensure … fair and free election.” That is not deference to law—it is judicial capture:
“Although the court stated that ICANN has ‘no locus standi’ … the Court recognized that … a fair and free election … is to be ensured.”
This is precisely the kind of abdication of the rule of law that critics warn about: letting an external supranational body dictate actions to a national court system, under cover of global norms.
- Demanding authority over elections that should be community-led
ICANN, through Lindqvist, has repeatedly sought to impose oversight and control over the election process at AFRINIC—a process that is supposed to be initiated, conducted, and overseen by the membership itself under AFRINIC’s bylaws. Lindqvist’s letters demand that the receiver, NomCom, and ElecCom respond to ICANN’s questions about membership classification (notably over Cloud Innovation), transparency, and the status of votes. In doing so, he treats the election as if ICANN were the ultimate arbiter rather than a steward.
Moreover, ICANN raised the specter of sanctions and threatened that AFRINIC may be placed under a compliance review that could lead to derecognition under the ICP-2 regime (the ICANN policy for recognizing RIRs).
That threat implicitly stakes out a power to pick AFRINIC’s leaders, or punish them if they resist.
In effect, Lindqvist is circumventing AFRINIC’s bottom-up governance model and replacing it with a top-down chain of command from ICANN.
- Demands even without a functioning board
Worryingly, ICANN’s interference included demands that AFRINIC continue allocating IP addresses despite having no constituted board or sitting CEO. These demands flew in the face of the constitutional logic of Mauritius (as host country) and the Companies Act, and ignored basic principles of corporate governance. While publicly disguised as continuity measures, they established a precedent of ICANN expecting de facto control over AFRINIC’s essential functions, regardless of internal legitimacy.
Insiders in the AFRINIC community and past reporting have raised precisely that complaint: that ICANN would not accept “blank governance” and insisted on operational continuity under its supervision.
- Bypassing multistakeholder norms with ICP-2 and a “quiet power grab”
Lindqvist’s strongest assault on institutional safeguards lies in his use of the ICP-2 compliance framework as a tool for control. Under ICP-2 (Criteria for Establishment of New Regional Internet Registries), ICANN holds the theoretical power to derecognize an RIR for noncompliance.
But prior to Lindqvist’s arrival, ICP-2 assessments were largely consensual, multistakeholder exercises. Under his leadership, ICANN has pushed a revised Implementation and Assessment Procedures that expands its authority while bypassing community review.
Critics call this a “quiet power grab”: granting ICANN sweeping authority to de-recognize regional registries with scant checks or consultation.
Though ICANN has not yet pulled the trigger on AFRINIC, its tone and posture suggest that derecognition remains a latent threat.
Indeed, ICANN’s partial backtracking, saying it would prefer a solution without derecognition, may be a tactical recalibration rather than a renunciation of authority.
Mauritius law, AFRINIC bylaws, and constitutional transgression
Lindqvist’s interventions violate the constitutional and statutory fabric of Mauritius, as well as AFRINIC’s own bylaws.
AFRINIC is incorporated under the laws of Mauritius, and is therefore bound by the Constitution of Mauritius, the Companies Act 2001, and the decisions of Mauritian courts. Its board, membership, and functions must operate within that legal framework. ICANN’s demands—that the court receiver must obey ICANN’s directions, that elections must conform to ICANN’s standards, and that ICANN’s oversight is non-derivative of court leave—strike at the sovereignty of Mauritius and the independence of its judicial system.
Under Mauritius’ constitution, courts cannot be overridden by unelected international actors. To demand that the court receiver comply with ICANN, regardless of court orders, amounts to an attempt to subordinate Mauritian judicial authority to a global body. Such conduct is inimical to the rule of law.
Likewise, under the Companies Act, no external party, not even ICANN, may demand internal control of a company’s board, election processes, or asset allocation, unless so allowed by statute or by valid court order. ICANN’s insistence on oversight, threats of sanctions, and demand for election control violate that principle.
Flouting AFRINIC’s own bylaws (the “Constitution” of AFRINIC)
AFRINIC’s Bylaws (2020 version) define the company, membership, election procedures, nomination committee, board powers, and procedural safeguards.
Multiple specific violations can be pointed to in recent events:
Annulment of election over a single proxy: The June 2025 election was annulled because of a single disputed proxy, discarding all valid votes. This action violated AFRINIC’s bylaws, which lack any clause justifying wholesale annulment under such a circumstance.
Bypassing community consent: AFRINIC bylaws dictate that policy adopted by the Board must be submitted to the community for endorsement; if not endorsed, it cannot be enforced.
The “revised election playbook” allegedly imposed by internal actors without broad consent appears to violate that requirement.
Misuse of the Nomination Committee / Election Committee (NomCom / ElecCom): ICANN’s demands about reconstituting these committees betray a disregard for the bylaws that mandate how and when they are constituted.
Ignoring procedural safeguards in proxy handling: The bylaws prescribe rules around proxy votes (Article 12.12) and procedures for handling disputes. AFRINIC’s own election committee’s decision to void the entire election rather than resolve a contested proxy is widely seen as inconsistent with a fair reading of those rules.
Lindqvist’s silence on these clear internal breaches is telling. If ICANN is truly concerned about governance, it should have condemned these abuses unequivocally. Instead, he pressed forward with oversight demands and court interventions that shift decision-making power away from AFRINIC’s membership.
Why this matters: Africa’s sovereignty over the internet at stake
At stake is the core of internet sovereignty, institutional trust, and the autonomy of developing regions in global governance.
The global internet model is premised on multistakeholder, bottom-up structures. AFRINIC, as a regional registry, embodies that model. In principle, local members vote, decide policy, and choose leadership. Lindqvist’s interventions amount to a top-down imposition: ICANN wants to pick AFRINIC’s leaders, supervise its elections, and reserve the right to punish or dismiss dissenters. The result is a hollowing-out of local agency under the guise of reforms.
AFRINIC’s internal missteps have already eroded trust in its governance. But ICANN’s overreach risks further damage, driving members into legal contests, diminishing confidence in institutional fairness, and prompting fragmentation. If the perception takes hold that AFRINIC is controlled from outside, why would African stakeholders invest time, resources, or legitimacy in it?
Some within the community see merit in reset—reconstituting a regional registry (or even dissolving AFRINIC and shifting its functions) under more robust institutional guarantees. Cloud Innovation, for example, has formally petitioned for AFRINIC’s winding-up.
But that agenda is being co-opted by ICANN’s interventionist posture. If ICANN positions itself as the gatekeeper of any successor, Africa risks ceding its registry autonomy. The possibility of derecognition looms as a stick to discipline dissenters.
In short: ICANN, under Lindqvist, is losing control of its legitimacy and attempting to reclaim it through over-extension of reach. It undermines courts, treats receivers as subordinate agents, and vacuums in election power—all while publically invoking stability and global norms. It has bypassed its own multistakeholder processes to push ICP-2 reforms granting sweeping power over regional registries.
What must come next: legal, institutional and community remedies
To reclaim integrity and protect regional autonomy, several steps are urgently needed:
Mauritian judiciary must reassert supremacy. Courts must refuse to countenance filings from ICANN that bypass proper locus, and should rebuke any attempt to subordinate their decisions to ICANN policy preferences. The receiver must act only within the legal scope granted by the court, not under external pressure.
Bylaw reform and procedural clarity. AFRINIC’s members must urgently revise the bylaws to insert robust safeguards: clear dispute resolution, proportional remedies (not full election annulment for proxy issues), enhanced transparency obligations, and community veto rights over major changes.
A transparent, community-led election process. The next AFRINIC election must be run by members, under independent oversight agreeable to all stakeholders, not by ICANN. No external candidate approval or interference should be tolerated.
Push back against ICP-2 overreach. The community must demand that ICANN’s compliance framework respect regional autonomy and adhere to multistakeholder norms—not become a cudgel to enforce control.
Explore architectural alternatives. If AFRINIC’s model is irredeemably broken, the community should consider alternatives (perhaps a federated RIR model or restructuring) that preserve bottom-up control, not transfer control to distant authorities.
Mobilize continental and governmental support. African governments, regional bodies like the African Union, and technical communities must support a sovereignty affirmation in internet governance—refusing to accept governance dominated by external supra-institutions.
A crossroads in African internet governance
We are witnessing a turning point. The failures at AFRINIC provided a tempting opening for external actors to intervene. But the path ICANN is taking—pushing court interventions, demanding oversight, threatening derecognition, and ignoring legal limits—is not a path to stability. It is a path to coercion.
Kurtis Lindqvist’s strategy amounts to an abandonment of the rule of law: to treat courts as instruments, receivers as subordinates, and elections as optional unless ICANN approves them. In doing so, he undermines both Mauritius’ constitutional order and AFRINIC’s bylaws.
If African stakeholders allow this trajectory to stand, they risk forever loosing control over their IP resource governance. But if they force a reset; legal, institutional, communal; they can reclaim that control, reinforce trust, and protect the principle that Africa’s internet should be governed by Africans, on their terms.
