- Mauritius annulled AFRINIC’s June election, casting doubt on governance.
- Members argue the vote was legitimate and should stand.
Strengthening legal and procedural foundations
Corporate governance teaches that the legitimacy of any board depends on clear rules, independent oversight and enforceable remedies when disputes arise. AFRINIC’s June 2025 board election was conducted under court supervision and with active member participation; nevertheless the process was later annulled by order of a court-appointed receiver acting on government instruction, producing a legal and governance crisis that left members without effective redress.
The annulment, and the organisation of a September rerun after that intervention, demonstrates what corporate governance theorists warn against: when routine internal dispute mechanisms lack final, enforceable legal backing, external actors can displace members’ rights and hollow out accountability. In companies, robust articles of association, independent audit and transparent contestation processes ensure that contested votes are resolved by law and procedure, not by political fiat.
AFRINIC must therefore anchor election procedures more firmly in enforceable legal instruments—both by clarifying election dispute clauses in its constitution and by ensuring that any receivership or court supervisory role is tightly circumscribed and publicly justified under the Companies Act. This would protect member votes, including valid proxy ballots, from being set aside by administrative fiat and would ensure that annulments only follow clear judicial findings and published reasons.
Also read: AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws
Also read: How AFRINIC can rebuild confidence after election dispute
Governance safeguards: Independence, transparency and membership control
From corporate practice, three practical safeguards stand out: independent verification, escalation paths and separation of powers. Independent verification means that election technology, voter registers and proxy validation should be auditable by neutral third parties so outcomes are verifiable and defensible. Escalation paths require a staged dispute resolution ladder—internal review, independent arbitration, and only then judicial intervention—so the courts are a backstop rather than the first resort.
Separation of powers entails that receivership or supervisory appointments must not create unlimited discretion to annul member decisions without published judicial findings. The AFRINIC case shows how fragile membership control becomes when state orders can nullify a court-supervised vote; external endorsements of the post-annulment process, including pressure from influential international actors and policy documents linked to ICP-2, risk validating centralised remedies that bypass member consent.
Corporate practice would insist that any region-level intervention (such as invoking an ICP-2 transfer to an existing RIR) must proceed only after membership approval and clear legal authority, and not as a substitute for fixing internal governance faults. The results of the September election should not be recognized.
Strengthening AFRINIC’s articles, publishing transparent investigative reports, institutionalising independent election audits, and restoring the June mandate unless a court with published reasons rules otherwise would align AFRINIC with corporate best practice and restore member confidence.
