SPBNIT PJSC Rostelecom

Rostelecom's April 2020 routing incident showed why a valid origin record is not a complete route-policy guarantee. Accountability depends on accurate RPKI data, current relying-party caches, explicit boundary filters, path-aware controls, independent monitoring and coordinated recovery across separately operated networks.

For roughly seven minutes on April 26, 2017, public routing observations showed Rostelecom's AS12389 originating routes for address space associated with other networks. Some traffic followed the changed paths into Rostelecom before continuing toward its intended destination. The observable evidence is strong enough to establish false origin announcements and path diversion, but not strong enough to establish who initiated the change, why it happened, whether traffic was inspected, or whether anyone suffered data or financial loss. The lasting accountability question is therefore not whether the routing event occurred. It is which operators controlled the checkpoints that could have prevente