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RIPE NCC · مراقبة سجلات الإنترنت الإقليمية

SLURM file for Unallocated and Unassigned RIPE NCC Address Space

ابدأ من هنا للاطلاع على سجل كل مقترح على حدة: ما الذي تغيّر، ولماذا كان مهمًا، ومن دافع عن أي موقف، وكيف تطورت المواقف، وما الذي تقرر، وأين لا تزال هناك ثغرات في الأدلة.

حقائق موثقة

معرّف السياسة
2019-08
RIR
RIPE NCC
الحالة الرسمية
Withdrawn
تاريخ الطرح
31‏/10‏/2019
آخر تحديث للمصادر
11‏/11‏/2026

من الذي شكّل النقاش فعلياً؟

5إجمالي المشاركين
5الجهات الرسمية

تطور السياسة

2.0
مسحوبة · Withdrawn
24‏/04‏/2020
حقائق موثقة ↗

Separate trust anchor for registry-created AS0 ROAs · Version 2 adds a dedicated trust anchor and TAL file for RIPE NCC's AS0 ROAs, so tools and researchers can distinguish registry-created records for unallocated or unassigned space from operational ROAs created by resource holders. Version 1 stated the registry's authority to create these ROAs but did not specify this separate distribution arrangement.

Revocation wording before an allocation · Version 1 explicitly allowed allocation only after the AS0 ROAs had been fully removed and were no longer visible in repositories. Version 2 retains the requirement to revoke the relevant AS0 ROAs when allocating space, but omits that explicit repository-visibility condition and the word 'beforehand'. Its opposing-arguments section still discusses a delay of at least 24 hours; this comparison does not turn that discussion into an adopted timing rule.

Discussion of less-specific announcements · Version 2 adds an explicit limitation: a less-specific covering announcement can circumvent the AS0 ROA protection. The authors argue that a covering route spanning allocated resources would attract monitoring alerts. This is a qualified threat assessment added to the rationale, not a guarantee that monitoring prevents such announcements.

Registry and validator processing costs · Version 2 adds the possible registry cost and validator processing burden of a large AS0 ROA set. It distinguishes the limited IPv4 pools described in the proposal from the potentially much larger IPv6 set associated with sparse allocation. These are the draft's operational concerns, not measured costs or a forecast that every validator will be overloaded.

3.0
مسحوبة · Withdrawn
24‏/04‏/2020
حقائق موثقة ↗

Distribution through SLURM assertions · Version 3 replaces the proposed registry-created AS0 ROAs with a downloadable SLURM file containing AS0 assertions for unallocated and unassigned IPv4 and IPv6 space under RIPE NCC administration. It specifies a well-known URL and automated use by relying parties under RFC 8416. Version 2 instead separated the registry's ROAs under a dedicated trust anchor and TAL. This is a proposed distribution change, not evidence that either design was deployed.

Relying-party choice and configuration · Version 3 explicitly makes use of the file a relying-party choice: a configuration directive can enable or disable processing, and users can incorporate the assertions or leave them out. The rationale also suggests CDN distribution and frequent updates. Version 2 described a separate TAL for distinguishing registry ROAs; it did not include this SLURM-specific configuration and distribution explanation. The proposal's claim of equivalent information does not mean all networks would choose identical validation policy.

Updating protection when resources are allocated · Version 3 requires the relevant AS0 entry in the SLURM file to be updated at the time space is allocated to a member. This replaces Version 2's requirement to revoke the relevant AS0 ROAs. The earlier opposing-arguments discussion of waiting at least 24 hours between revocation and notification is absent from Version 3; the new text does not establish how quickly every relying party will retrieve an update.

Cost concern shifts to relying-party memory · Version 2 discusses RIPE NCC's operational cost and validator processing time for many ROAs. Version 3 reframes this concern around relying-party software needing more memory to process many assertions. The IPv4-versus-IPv6 distinction remains: the draft expects a relatively limited IPv4 set and a considerable IPv6 set because of sparse allocation. Neither version supplies a measured capacity benchmark.

الخط الزمني للنقاش

  1. الطرح

    الطرح

    حقائق موثقة ↗
  2. إصدار رسمي

    1.0

    مسحوبة · Withdrawn

    حقائق موثقة ↗
  3. إصدار رسمي

    2.0

    مسحوبة · Withdrawn

    حقائق موثقة ↗
  4. إصدار رسمي

    3.0

    مسحوبة · Withdrawn

    حقائق موثقة ↗
  5. قرار رسمي

    withdrawn

    withdrawn

    حقائق موثقة ↗

الكيانات

آخر تحديث:

جارٍ التحميل

المصادر والتغطية

المصادر الرسمية

أرشيفات المناقشات العامة

التغطية

أقدم مادة محفوظة: 30‏/06‏/1992
أحدث مادة محفوظة: 14‏/11‏/2026