AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws is tracked as a internet infrastructure institution within the internet infrastructure ecosystem.
AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws has public-source relevance to network operations, governance, dependency mapping, or market structure.
AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws has public-source relevance to network operations, governance, dependency mapping, or market structure.
AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws is tracked as a internet infrastructure institution within the internet infrastructure ecosystem.
Public-source signals support medium-impact monitoring for infrastructure visibility and dependency analysis.
Public-source signals support medium-impact monitoring for infrastructure visibility and dependency analysis.
| 0.90–1.00 | A | High — direct sources |
| 0.75–0.89 | A/B | Strong |
| 0.55–0.74 | B/C | Medium |
| 0.35–0.54 | C/D | Weak–medium |
| 0.10–0.34 | D | Weak signal |
| 0.00–0.09 | D | Internal monitoring |
多个公开来源
AFRINIC 2025年9月的选举公然违反了其自身的章程,引发了严重的合法性担忧,并破坏了非洲的互联网治理。 另见: AfriNIC会员名册神秘消失.
- 选举在提名委员会组成、代理投票权和董事任命方面违反了章程,使整个过程不合法且不正当。
- 2025年6月的选举结果因一项代理投票争议而被废除,但它仍然是唯一合法且具代表性的选举结果。
当AFRINIC成员在2025年9月再次投票时,他们所依据的程序颇具争议且可能违法。尽管经历了数月的诉讼和法院监督,被委以恢复秩序重任的机构——法院任命的官方接管人——却监督了一场践踏AFRINIC自身章程的选举。这场9月的投票非但没有解决治理危机,反而加深了人们对非洲地区互联网注册管理机构合法性及法治的质疑。
选举存在太多违反章程之处
问题的核心在于AFRINIC的章程。其章程内容明确、详尽,旨在防范的程序捷径和权力操弄,正是如今威胁其治理的因素。然而,在9月的选举中,多个条款被公然无视。
章程9.1和9.1-A条款:这些规定非常明确。任何在有空缺董事会席位地区定居的人,都不能在提名委员会(NomCom)任职。而且,提名委员会成员不得同时参选。这些规则旨在防止利益冲突,确保候选人筛选的中立性。然而,9月提名委员会的构成本身就违反了这一保障措施,因为所有五个子区域同时进行改选。因此根据章程,一个“合规”的提名委员会不可能存在——但一个提名委员会还是组建了,从一开始就玷污了选举程序。
章程12.12条款:更令人震惊的是接管人单方面取消了代理投票。AFRINIC章程允许成员指定代理人代表其投票——在这个并非每个成员都能亲自或在线参与的地区,这是一项至关重要的民主机制。9月的选举完全取消了这一权利,坚持只能在线参与。理由呢?为了避免重蹈6月争议选举的覆辙,当时一项有争议的代理投票导致选举被废除。但通过剥夺更多人的权利来纠正一项违规行为,绝非解决之道。相反,它剥夺了章程和毛里求斯公司法明确赋予成员的权利。 另见: AfriNIC 消失的成员登记册.
第13条:董事的任命:章程明确规定了董事的任命方式——通过依据AFRINIC章程进行的选举来任命。9月的程序绕开了成员批准的程序,在未经协商或同意的情况下重塑了投票系统,避开了董事会任命的法律框架。结果是:董事的产生方式与AFRINIC自身的规定不符。 另见: 亚历杭德罗·费尔南德斯.
官方接管人的越权行为
同样令人不安的是9月投票的来由。最初,法院任命的接管人任期本应在6月选举被废除后,于2025年6月30日届满。在未经实质性磋商的情况下,他的权力被延长至9月30日。如此,接管人行使了远超法院最初设想的临时看管人角色的权力。接管人没有充当中立协调人,而是重新设计了AFRINIC治理的基本面,实际上凭一己之权重写规则。
其讽刺意味显而易见:6月一次有争议的代理投票就足以成为废除整场选举的理由。而在9月,全盘否定章程、成员权利和既定程序的做法却被允许成立。如果6月的结果因为一个技术细节而被宣告无效,那么9月的结果——建立在多项明确违规之上——更应被宣告无效。 另见: 阿尔多·加西亚.
另请阅读: AFRINIC选举:选举委员会成员威胁辞职,选民欺诈被揭露
另请阅读: 为何AFRINIC的选举安全需要在毛里求斯获得更强的法律保障
危险的先例
承认9月选举合法性的后果远不止于AFRINIC。AFRINIC管理着整个非洲大陆的IP地址分配,因此在全球互联网治理体系中扮演着至关重要的角色。其可信度取决于其对正当程序和章程的遵守。通过认可违反章程的选举,AFRINIC正在接纳任意治理,侵蚀信任,并破坏世界各地区域注册管理机构的权威。 另见: Alcymer Vieira.
所谓代理投票被“滥用”的说法,不能成为完全废除它的借口。所谓截止日期“不方便”的说法,不能成为未经透明程序就延长任期的借口。而所谓必须组建提名委员会——即使违反章程——的说法,也不能成为让候选人在非法阴影下就职的借口。这些捷径每走一条,都在削弱AFRINIC迫切需要的合法性。 另见: 阿尔西德斯·克雷莫内齐.
承认6月的结果
恢复信任的唯一途径是:承认2025年6月选举的结果。那次选举无论存在何种缺陷,都是在AFRINIC章程框架内进行的。围绕一项代理投票的争议本应通过调查和补救来解决——而非通过废除整个选举并全盘重塑程序。相比之下,9月的投票是在法律之外进行的,违反了多项章程规定,并剥夺了成员的权利。
合法性不能建立在便利之上。AFRINIC的角色要求进行自由、合法且民主的选举。9月的选举与这些要求背道而驰,反而为权力滥用、无视章程以及非洲大陆互联网治理的危险先例打开了大门。AFRINIC必须承认显而易见的事实:9月的选举无效。唯一民主合法的做法是恢复6月的结果,让当时依据章程合法投票的成员的声音被听到。 另见: 阿尔贝托·安纳亚.
Domain of operation
AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws is profiled by BTW Media because published evidence links it to internet infrastructure, governance, operational dependencies, or market visibility.
- Public role: AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws is framed by afrinic’s september elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws is tracked as a internet infrastructure institution within the internet infrastructure ecosystem. and public security context. 证据基础: AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws article record; AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws article record
- Operating surface: Governance and Africa provide the public context for this institution profile. 证据基础: AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws article record; AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws article record
时间线
- AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws public profile updated
Public coverage records AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws as a subject for role, operating context, and evidence review.
概要
- 名称: AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws
- 类型: Internet infrastructure institution
- 所在地: Africa
- 档案重点: Institution
功能说明
- 公开记录可用于跟踪其角色、服务和关键关系。
重要性
- Public-source signals support medium-impact monitoring for infrastructure visibility and dependency analysis.
- 运营关键性: Medium
- 时间范围: Next quarter
关注事项
- 监测重点是经核实的服务连续性、治理变化和关系信号。
跟踪经验证的来源更新、角色变化和当前公开证据。
Public-source signals support medium-impact monitoring for infrastructure visibility and dependency analysis.
长期相关性取决于经验证的运营、政策和关系变化。
会员简报
深度档案背景
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公开视角
The public read of AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws is limited to visible role, operating context, and relationship evidence.
观察点
- New public role, affiliation, product, policy, or market disclosures.
- Verified relationship changes involving named organizations or people.
限制说明
- Private or unverified claims are excluded from this public view.
常见问题
Why is AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws included?
AFRINIC’s September elections were a flagrant violation of its own bylaws has public evidence that makes the institution relevant to BTW's coverage of digital infrastructure, governance, or markets.
What is public about this profile?
The public layer covers visible role, operating context, linked organizations, and evidence-backed watchpoints.
What should readers watch next?
Readers should watch for source-backed role changes, new partnerships, regulatory exposure, operating expansion, or evidence that changes the public assessment.






